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Reading Between the Lines of Electronic Health 
Records: The Health Information Technology for 
Economic and Clinical Health Act and Its Implications 
for Health Care Fraud and Information Security 
JOSEPH D. SZEREJKO 
The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical 
Health (HITECH) Act, which Congress passed as part of the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, has set in motion 
a widespread increase in the use of electronic health records (EHRs) 
across the American health care industry. While EHRs are not new 
to health care, their being the standard format for purposes of 
documenting patients’ health records across the United States is a 
modern reality. By monetarily rewarding health care providers for 
adopting and using EHRs and by penalizing noncompliant 
providers, the HITECH Act seeks to achieve this reality through its 
meaningful use incentive program.  
This Note examines the ways in which widespread use of EHRs 
in the American health care industry will impact the security and 
privacy of protected health information. Furthermore, this Note 
predicts how the proliferation of EHRs may complicate, and in some 
cases obstruct, health care fraud detection. In this vein, this Note 
assesses the tactical options available to anti-fraud authorities as 
they adapt their auditing, detection, and enforcement efforts to an 
electronic world. Finally, this Note offers recommendations as to 
how prosecutors, law enforcement authorities, lawmakers, 
providers, and patients can improve health care fraud detection.    
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Reading Between the Lines of Electronic Health 
Records: The Health Information Technology for 
Economic and Clinical Health Act and Its Implications 
for Health Care Fraud and Information Security 
JOSEPH D. SZEREJKO 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It is an understatement to say that technology has influenced health 
care’s development over the past several decades. For example, diabetes 
patients can monitor their insulin levels with a transdermal patch,1 
radiologists in India can read an American patient’s X-rays at the click of a 
mouse,2 and surgeons can operate on patients with robots.3 Technology 
constantly improves the quality of health care and medical research, but it 
also influences the law. Accordingly, legal practitioners, legislators, and 
health care providers should monitor technological health care 
developments every step of the way, for they have rippling effects.  
The proliferation of electronic health records (EHRs)4 is a major trend 
in health information technology5 that has impacted—and will continue to 
                                                                                                                          
 J.D. Candidate, University of Connecticut School of Law, Class of 2015. I would like to thank 
everyone at the United States Attorney’s Office in Hartford for providing me with valuable insight and 
guidance with respect to prosecuting health care fraud. Further, I would like to thank Special Assistant 
United States Attorney Michael Ahern and Michael Cohen, Inspector at the United States Department 
of Health and Human Services for sparking my interest in the issues encompassed in this Note. I would 
also like to thank Adjunct Professor Joshua Stein from the University of Connecticut School of Law for 
sharing his thoughts with me on the privacy and security of EHRs. I would also like to thank my 
friends and family for supporting me throughout my writing this Note. Finally, I would especially like 
to thank the editors of Volumes 46 and 47 of the Connecticut Law Review for their help in preparing 
my Note for publication. This Note would not have been possible without their valuable efforts and 
recommendations. 
1 See, e.g., What is V-Go?, V-GO, https://www.go-vgo.com/what-is-vgo (last visited Jan. 28, 
2015) (describing a transdermal patch that monitors and delivers insulin for diabetes patients).  
2 See, e.g., James Brice, Globalization Comes to Radiology: Global Nighthawks Thrive While 
Outsourcers Hire Foreign-Trained Radiologists to Read for U.S. Imaging Practices, DIAGNOSTIC 
IMAGING.COM (Nov. 2003), http://web.mit.edu/outsourcing/class1/DI-radiology-1.htm (describing a 
doctor’s routine practice of performing radiological diagnoses in Bangalore, India for patients in 
Atlanta, Georgia).   
3 See, e.g., The Da Vinci Surgical System, INTUITIVE SURGICAL, http://www.intuitivesurgical.com 
/products/davinci_surgical_system/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2015) (describing the da Vinci surgical robot, a 
pioneering piece of machinery in the field of robotic surgery).  
4 The legislative, medical, legal, and academic materials discussing this topic occasionally refer to 
these records as electronic medical records (EMRs). This Note will refer to them as EHRs.  
5 See David Blumenthal, Launching HITECH, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 382, 382 (2010) (describing 
how installation and use of EHRs is an integral part of using health information technology).  
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impact—the intertwined medical and legal fields in the twenty-first 
century. EHRs streamline the provision of health care, make patients’ care 
more comprehensive, and put providers on equal footing from an 
informational perspective.6 For instance, if paramedics in Los Angeles roll 
an unconscious vacationing New Yorker into Cedars-Sinai’s Emergency 
Room after he has suffered a stroke, EHR technology permits attending ER 
physicians—after having looked at the patient’s identification—to look up 
the patient’s medical history and other personal health information at the 
click of a mouse.7 On the other hand, a hospital employee with bad 
intentions can access an EHR database and use patients’ confidential 
proprietary information for theft and other criminal purposes.8 Therein lies 
the rub: great technological innovations that facilitate saving lives also 
provide criminals with tools for their respective trade.     
EHR technology enhances the speed and efficacy of medicine and 
many providers have integrated EHR systems into their practices for these 
very reasons. However, while the federal government is able to cite a 
plethora of practical justifications for implementing a nationwide EHR 
system, there is also cause for concern. There are various reasons why 
many providers have not yet implemented EHR technology into their 
business models, but the primary reason that abstaining providers articulate 
is that implementation is too costly.9 In the first decade of the twenty-first 
century, health care providers in the United States, particularly smaller, 
private physician practices, were reluctant to launch EHR databases for 
                                                                                                                          
6 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-481, ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS: 
FIRST YEAR OF CMS’S INCENTIVE PROGRAMS SHOWS OPPORTUNITIES TO IMPROVE PROCESSES TO 
VERIFY PROVIDERS MET REQUIREMENTS 1 (2012) (“EHRs can be used . . . to electronically collect, 
store, retrieve, and transfer clinical information related to patients’ care, allowing ready access to this 
information by multiple providers in different locations”); but see Spencer S. Jones et al., Electronic 
Health Record Adoption and Quality Improvement in U.S. Hospitals, 16 AM. J. MANAGED CARE SP 64, 
SP 64 (2010) (offering a key finding that U.S. hospitals’ adoption of more advanced EHR systems 
actually was associated with decreases in quality improvement for treatment of heart patients).     
7 See, e.g., Gregory A. Wilson et al., The Effect of Immediate Access to a Computerized Medical 
Record on Physician Test Ordering: A Controlled Clinical Trial in the Emergency Room, 72 AM. J. 
PUB. HEALTH 698, 702 (1982) (suggesting that the patients who benefit most from treating doctors’ 
decision-making are those who have pre-existing medical records in computerized format at the time of 
treatment decisions).    
8 See, e.g., Erica Meltzer, Nurse Faces 51 Counts of Medical Records, ID Theft at Boulder 
Community Hospital, COLORADODAILY.COM (Sept. 27, 2011, 5:16 PM), http://www.coloradodaily 
.com/ci_18989489?source=most_viewed#axzz1ZFlRjK2P (reporting the story of a nurse who, while 
working for a nurse staffing agency in the Denver metro area, improperly accessed over a hundred 
patient medical records and used identity information to purchase credit cards and make other 
purchases).  
9 See Michael McBride, Measuring EHR Pain Points: High Cost, Poor Functionality Outweigh 
Benefits, Ease of Access, MED. ECON. (Feb. 10, 2014), http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine.com/ 
medical-economics/content/tags/ehr/measuring-ehr-pain-points-high-cost-poor-functionality-outweigh-
b?page=full (discussing how many physicians complain about the high costs associated with 
implementing and using EHRs). 
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their patient files.10 In order to install and use EHR technology, providers 
must shoulder the substantial costs of maintenance, training, and support 
for EHR databases in addition to the costs of purchasing and installing 
them.11 Providers’ reluctance in implementing EHR technology seems 
more justifiable in this light. Nevertheless, the federal government and 
various state governments have started to tackle providers’ reluctance in 
the interest of bringing the benefits of EHR technology to fruition.12 
On February 17, 2009, as part of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009,13 Congress passed the Health Information 
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH Act).14 The 
ultimate goal of the HITECH Act is to induce health care providers across 
the nation to “meaningfully use” EHR technology for all of their patients’ 
medical records.15 Among other legislative objectives, the HITECH Act 
provides incentive payments to clinicians and hospitals that implement and 
“meaningfully use” EHR technology.16 Further, the Act enforces standard 
EHR requirements and aims to incentivize nearly all covered health care 
entities to adopt EHR technology by 2019.17 In essence, the Act’s 
“meaningful use” program conditions clinicians’ receipt of incentive 
payments on their employment of EHR technology in such a way that 
                                                                                                                          
10 In 2006, the Healthcare Information Management Systems Society interviewed 2,500 physician 
offices around the United States and found that all of them had a practice management system. 
However, when the interviewers asked the offices if they had an EHR system, only 26% of them 
answered in the affirmative. Further, when the interviewers asked the other 74% of the offices if they 
planned on purchasing EHR technology in the next two years, the predominant answer was no. Can 
Small Healthcare Groups Feasibly Adopt Electronic Medical Records Technology?: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform and Oversight of the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 109th Cong. 6 
(2006) (statement of Jack Price, Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society, HIMSS 
Analytics). 
11 Id. at 7.  
12 See John Rancourt & Fadesola Adetosoye, EHR Adoption Encouraged by State Meaningful Use 
Acceleration Challenge 2.0, HEALTHIT BUZZ (Apr. 3, 2013, 5:25 PM), http://www.healthit.gov/buzz-
blog/meaningful-use/ehr-adoption-encouraged-state-meaningful-acceleration-challenge-20/ (“Last year, 
ONC, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), and our partners in the states stepped on 
[the] gas pedal of Meaningful Use Acceleration—our catch-all phrase for all efforts related to bringing 
down costs and improving health care quality through EHR adoption and meeting Meaningful Use 
criteria.”). 
13 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009).  
14 Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 
Stat. 226 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
15 David Blumenthal & Marilyn Tavenner, The “Meaningful Use” Regulation for Electronic 
Health Records, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 501, 501 (2010). 
16 Mark Faccenda & Lara Parkin, Meaningful Use – What Does it Mean to You?, 23 HEALTH  
LAW. 10, 10 (2011).  
17 See Whitepaper: A Summary of the HITECH Act, ATHENAHEALTH, INC. 2 (Mar. 2009), 
http://www.athenahealth.com/_doc/pdf/HITECH_Fact_Sheet_Whitepaper.pdf (“Prior to the HITECH 
Act, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) anticipated that under existing laws, 65% of physicians 
would have adopted an EHR by 2019. It now estimates that the incentive mechanisms of the HITECH 
Act will boost these adoption rates to 90% of physicians.”). 
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benefits their patients and health care in general.18 Specifically, the 
HITECH Act makes as much as $27 billion in incentive payments 
available over ten years, and makes as much as $44,000 through Medicare 
and $63,750 through Medicaid available to each clinician.19   
Some of the major difficulties that have already arisen—and that likely 
will become more pronounced—include: the widespread costs that 
clinicians have been forced to bear in preparing to comply with the 
mandate; the transformed availability of patients’ protected health 
information in cyber media; and the difficulties that EHR technology will 
create for detecting health care fraud.20 Other issues likely will arise as 
EHRs become increasingly prevalent.  
The purpose of this Note is twofold. First, it seeks to evaluate several 
major impacts that the HITECH Act’s EHR agenda will have on the 
privacy and security of protected health information under the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).21 Second, 
this Note seeks to examine the difficulties that the proliferation of EHRs 
will create for prosecutors in detecting health care fraud and recommends 
how responsible authorities should respond to these difficulties. Part II 
begins with a description of the HITECH Act’s EHR agenda, particularly 
with respect to its incentive payment program and its promulgation of 
meaningful use requirements. Further, Part II evaluates the HITECH Act’s 
modifications to HIPAA, including its inclusion of business associates as 
liable entities22 and its establishment of the data breach notification law.23 
Part III begins by discussing the False Claims Act24 and federal criminal 
statutes that penalize health care fraud. It then assesses how the HITECH 
Act’s meaningful use program, EHR incentive program, and its 
modifications to HIPAA will alter prosecutorial efforts to detect health 
care fraud. Part IV makes preliminary recommendations to prosecutors, 
legislators, and administrative officials regarding the difficulties that EHRs 
create for detecting health care fraud. This Note concludes by recognizing 
                                                                                                                          
18 See Blumenthal & Tavenner, supra note 15, at 501–03 (discussing the meaningful use core and 
menu objectives and noting how they progressively encourage usage of EHRs to improve clinical 
outcomes).  
19  Id. at 501. 
20 See Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Finding a Cure: The Case for Regulation and 
Oversight of Electronic Health Record Systems, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 103, 119–24 (2008) (discussing 
the increases in potential for data errors, risk of security breach, and economic cost associated with 
integration of EHR systems).  
21 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–191, 110 Stat. 
1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.302–
164.318 (2013) (providing the HIPAA Security Rule); 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.500–164.534 (2013) 
(providing the HIPAA Privacy Rule).   
22 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.306(a)(1)–(4).   
23 42 U.S.C. § 17932 (2012). 
24 False Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1621 (1863) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. 
§§ 3729–3733 (2012)). 
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the substantial benefits of EHR technology and by making predictions 
about the future of EHRs under the current regulatory regime.   
II.  THE HEALTH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOR ECONOMIC AND 
CLINICAL HEALTH ACT AND THE SPREAD OF                                           
ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS 
A.  The Electronic Health Record Incentive Payment Program 
The HITECH Act’s incentive payment program aims to promote the 
widespread use of EHR technology across the American health care 
industry by providing carrots for those professionals and hospitals that 
shoulder the onerous burdens associated with implementing and using this 
technology.25 One of the primary means by which the HITECH Act 
achieves this overarching goal is its grant of permission to the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services to provide incentive payments to 
Medicare-eligible professionals, hospitals, and critical access hospitals26 
that “demonstrate meaningful use of certified EHR technology.”27 The 
HITECH Act also sets forth a similar Medicaid EHR incentive program.28 
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services propound that the 
incentive program is not simply a reimbursement system for purchasing 
EHR technology, and they stress that payments are conditioned upon use.29 
Thus, these payments are spoils that must go to the victors—those 
Medicare- and Medicaid-eligible professionals, hospitals, and critical 
access hospitals that succeed in meeting the Act’s EHR use requirements.  
The HITECH Act also established the Office of the National 
Coordinator for Health Information Technology (National Coordinator), 
                                                                                                                          
25 See Nitin Chhoda, HITECH Act Explained, EMR NEWS: DUMBED DOWN EMR (July 9, 2012), 
http://www.emrnews.com/the-hitech-act/ (“Most of the incentives focus on promoting the use of 
electronic medical records and electronic health records. Because electronic records cut down on long 
term costs, but require an initial investment that many clinics don’t want to make, ARRA and the 
HITECH Act offer financial benefits if you make the switch.”).  
26 The Social Security Act provides, inter alia, that a State may designate a health care facility as 
a critical access hospital if it is in a statutorily-defined rural area, is at least thirty-five miles away from 
any other hospital, makes 24-hour emergency care services available, and provides no more than 
twenty-five acute care inpatient beds. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-4(c)(2)(B) (2012). 
27 EHR Incentive Programs, CMS.GOV, http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legis 
lation/EHRIncentivePrograms/index.html?redirect=/EHRIncentivePrograms/ (last updated Apr. 2, 
2015,  4:02 PM) [hereinafter EHR Incentive Programs].  
28 Medicare and Medicaid EHR Incentive Program Basics, CMS.GOV, http://www.cms.gov/ 
Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/Basics.html (last updated Feb. 18, 
2015, 2:45 PM) [hereinafter Medicare and Medicaid EHR Incentive Program Basics]. The Medicare 
Incentive Program launched in 2011, so payments to participants who started then will continue 
annually until 2016. Participants can begin the program after 2011, at which point a participant’s five-
year continuous payment plan starts accumulating. However, the last year to begin is 2014. Participants 
who begin the program in 2014 will finish receiving incentive payments in 2019. Id. 
29 EHR Incentive Programs, supra note 27.  
 1110 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1103 
which is an office within the Department of Health and Human Services.30 
The National Coordinator is responsible for reviewing and endorsing the 
EHR meaningful use requirements promulgated by the Health Information 
Technology Standards Committee (Standards Committee),31 coordinating 
health information technology efforts between Executive Branch 
departments and the Department of Health and Human Services, and 
updating the Federal Health IT Strategic Plan32 to include specific 
benchmarks and metrics.33 The Standards Committee’s standards and 
certification specifications provide a basic framework that every EHR 
system should have, such that eligible professionals and hospitals using 
EHR technology have a reference point with which to compare their own 
EHR systems.34 The HITECH Act also established the Health Information 
Technology Policy Committee (Policy Committee), which is primarily 
responsible for making policy recommendations to the National 
Coordinator regarding the policy issues surrounding EHR technology.35 
                                                                                                                          
30 42 U.S.C. § 300jj-11(a) (2012). 
31 This Committee, comprised of health care providers, researchers, technology vendors, 
purchasers, health plans, consumers, and health care employees, is primarily responsible for testing—
with the assistance of other federal agencies such as the National Institute for Standards and 
Technology—certain standards and certification specifications for implementing coordinated EHR 
technology. Further, this Committee must ultimately recommend these standards to the National 
Coordinator. See id. § 300jj-13 (providing for the establishment, duties, membership, and operations of 
the Standards Committee). 
32 The National Coordinator released the Federal Health IT Strategic Plan in 2008 at the behest of 
President George W. Bush’s 2004 Executive Order calling for the development and implementation of 
a more robust health information technology infrastructure in the U.S. From a general perspective, the 
2008 Plan sought, inter alia, to encourage more widespread use of electronic health information and to 
make such use more coordinated amongst providers and patients, such that provision of care became 
more efficient and successful. See The ONC-Coordinated Federal Health Information Technology 
Strategic Plan: 2008-2012: Synopsis, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES 1–3 (June 3, 2008), 
http://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/hit-strategic-plan-summary-508-2.pdf (explaining the 
National Coordinator’s organization and its dual-purpose agenda of implementing and promoting EHR 
technology standards across the nation that will improve patient-focused health care, biomedical 
research, public health, and emergency preparedness).  
33 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300jj-11(c)(3)(A)(i)–(viii) (2012) (setting forth numerous objectives that the 
National Coordinator is responsible for accomplishing in its efforts, such as establishing security 
safeguards for protecting electronic health information, making the use of health information 
technology more conducive to positive health outcomes, and making health information technology 
more user-friendly).  
34 See, e.g., Health IT Standards Committee: Recommendations to the National Coordinator for 
Health IT, HEALTHIT.GOV, http://www.healthit.gov/facas/health-it-standards-committee/health-it-
standards-committee-recommendations-national-coordinator (last updated Apr. 2, 2015) (providing the 
Standards Committee’s propounded recommendations for health information technology standards). 
35 Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 300jj-12(b)(2)(B) (2012) provides:  
[T]he HIT Policy Committee shall make recommendations for at least the following 
areas:  
(i) Technologies that protect the privacy of health information and promote security 
in a qualified electronic health record, including for the segmentation and protection 
from disclosure of specific and sensitive individually identifiable health information 
with the goal of minimizing the reluctance of patients to seek care (or disclose 
information about a condition) because of privacy concerns . . . and for the use and 
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Specifically, the HITECH Act tasks the Policy Committee with setting 
forth official standards as to how providers should document and exchange 
patients’ “individually identifiable health information.”36   
As set forth in the Act, the Policy Committee, Standards Committee, 
and National Coordinator premise these standards and certification criteria 
on the objective of realizing the health care benefits associated with 
widespread use of EHRs.37 The primary benefits of widespread 
implementation and employment of EHR technology include providing 
physicians with more comprehensive and accurate patient information, 
fostering improved coordination among different providers who treat the 
same patient, and promoting increased patient discretion in controlling 
their own records.38 The HITECH Act’s incentive payments, along with 
the benefits accompanying widespread implementation of EHRs, 
                                                                                                                          
disclosure of limited data sets of such information. (ii) A nationwide health 
information technology infrastructure that allows for the electronic use and accurate 
exchange of health information. (iii) The utilization of a certified electronic health 
record for each person in the United States by 2014. (iv) Technologies that as a part 
of a qualified electronic health record allow for an accounting of disclosures made 
by a covered entity . . . for purposes of treatment, payment, and health care 
operations . . . . (v) The use of certified electronic health records to improve the 
quality of health care, such as by promoting the coordination of health care and 
improving continuity of health care among health care providers, by reducing 
medical errors, by improving population health, by reducing health disparities, by 
reducing chronic disease, and by advancing research and education. (vi) 
Technologies that allow individually identifiable health information to be rendered 
unusable, unreadable, or indecipherable to unauthorized individuals when such 
information is transmitted in the nationwide health information network or 
physically transported outside of the secured, physical perimeter of a health care 
provider, health plan, or health care clearinghouse. (vii) The use of electronic 
systems to ensure the comprehensive collection of patient demographic data, 
including, at a minimum, race, ethnicity, primary language, and gender information. 
(viii) Technologies that address the needs of children and other vulnerable 
populations.  
42 U.S.C. §§ 300jj-12(b)(2)(B)(i)–(viii) (2012).   
36 See id. § 300jj-12(b)(2)(A) (“The . . . Policy Committee shall recommend the areas in which 
standards, implementation specifications, and certification criteria are needed for the electronic 
exchange and use of health information for purposes of adoption under section 300jj-14 of this title and 
shall recommend an order of priority for the development, harmonization, and recognition of such 
standards, specifications, and certification criteria . . . includ[ing] named standards, architectures, and 
software schemes for the authentication and security of individually identifiable health information and 
other information as needed to ensure the reproducible development of common solutions across 
disparate entities.”).  
37 See id. §§ 300jj-11(c)(2)–(3) (providing the National Coordinator’s duties, most of which 
ultimately highlight the benefits of EHRs and aim to improve health care quality and access by 
facilitating their widespread use); see also id. §§ 300jj-12(b)(2)(B)–(C) (putting forth the areas that the 
Policy Committee should consider in making its recommendations, all of which concern achieving the 
widespread benefits of EHR technology); id. § 300jj-13(b)(1)(A) (providing that the Standards 
Committee’s recommendations as to standards and certification criteria shall be in harmony with those 
provided by the Policy Committee).   
38 See Benefits of Electronic Health Records (EHRs), HEALTHIT.GOV, http://www.healthit.gov 
/providers-professionals/benefits-electronic-health-records-ehrs (last updated Aug. 29, 2014) (“When 
fully functional and exchangeable, the benefits of EHRs offer far more than a paper record can.”). 
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ultimately depend on health care providers’ meaningful use of EHR 
technology. Beginning in 2015, Medicare-eligible professionals who do 
not meaningfully use EHRs will receive a one-percent Medicare payment 
reduction for that calendar year, which will increase by a percentage point 
for every subsequent year that the professional does not demonstrate 
meaningful use.39 
B.  Meaningful Use Requirements 
The success of implementing a comprehensive EHR database hinges 
on whether participating professionals and hospitals actually use the 
technology. Incentive payments under the HITECH Act are only available 
to the providers that demonstrate meaningful use of EHRs.40 According to 
Dr. David Blumenthal—who was the National Coordinator in 2010 when 
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services first published the 
meaningful use requirements—the requirements serve as a call to action 
for health care providers insofar as they delineate how clinicians should 
use EHR technology’s best features to their full potential.41 
Pursuant to the HITECH Act, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services have broken up the meaningful use requirements into three stages 
that providers must meet over the five consecutive years following the year 
that they begin the incentive payment program.42 Thus, professionals and 
hospitals that started the incentive program in 2011 were required to meet 
meaningful use requirements for at least ninety days during the first year 
and for the entire year of 2012;43 this period is Stage One.44 After meeting 
                                                                                                                          
39 Medicare and Medicaid EHR Incentive Program Basics, supra note 28. 
40 See id. (“To qualify for incentive payments, eligible professionals must successfully 
demonstrate meaningful use for each year of participation in the program.”). 
41 See Blumenthal & Tavenner, supra note 15, at 503 (“Other core objectives include using 
several software applications that begin to realize the true potential of EHRs to improve the safety, 
quality, and efficiency of care. These features help clinicians to make better clinical decisions—and 
avoid preventable errors. To qualify for incentive payments, clinicians must start employing such 
clinical decision support tools. They must also start using the capability that undergirds much of the 
value of EHRs: using records to enter clinical orders and, in particular, medication prescriptions. Only 
when providers enter orders electronically can the computer help improve decisions by applying 
clinical logic to those choices in light of all the recorded patient data. And to begin extending the 
benefits of EHRs to patients themselves, the meaningful use requirements will include providing 
patients with electronic versions of their health information.”).  
42 See EHR Incentives & Certification: EHR Incentive Programs, HEALTHIT.GOV, 
http://www.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/ehr-incentive-programs (last updated Jan. 15, 2013) 
(“Maximum EHR incentives are $44,000 over five consecutive years.”). For summaries of Stages One 
and Two of the meaningful use requirements, see EHR Incentives & Certification: Meaningful Use 
Definition & Objectives, HEALTHIT.GOV, http://www.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/meaningful-
use-definition-objectives (last updated Mar. 18, 2014).   
43 See My EHR Participation Timeline: 2011, CMS.GOV, http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-
Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/Participation-Timeline.html#.VOu541PF-Q4 (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2015) (noting that a provider who started meaningful use in 2011 would have to have 
demonstrated ninety days of Stage One meaningful use in 2011 to receive an incentive payment). That 
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the Stage One meaningful use requirements, providers that started in 2011 
then have to meet a different set of Stage Two requirements beginning in 
2014.45 Finally, Stage Three of meaningful use commences in 2017 and 
will require these providers to meet a third set of requirements.46 At the 
most basic level, Stage One focuses on generating protected health 
information in EHR format; Stage Two focuses on facilitating the 
exchange of such information; and Stage Three focuses on improving 
health outcomes with such information.47 
Under each of the three stages, the meaningful use objectives are 
broken into two groups: core objectives and menu set objectives.48 Stage 
One sets forth fifteen core objectives and ten menu set objectives for 
eligible professionals.49 Eligible professionals must meet the fifteen 
required core objectives and at least five of the menu set objectives.50 
There are fourteen required core objectives for eligible hospitals and 
critical access hospitals and a list of ten menu set objectives.51 Eligible 
hospitals must meet all fourteen core objectives and at least five of the ten 
menu set objectives.52 In addition to the meaningful use objectives, eligible 
professionals and hospitals must report clinical quality measures, which are 
metrics that measure health outcomes, clinical processes, patient safety, 
efficiency of resource use, care coordination, and overall patient health.53  
                                                                                                                          
same provider would have to demonstrate a full year of Stage One meaningful use in 2012 to receive an 
incentive payment in that year. Id. 
44 See, e.g., Meaningful Use: What Do You Know?, DEL. REGIONAL EXTENSION CENTER, 
http://www.dehitrec.org/Documents/MU-What%20Do%20You%20Know%20%2010%2027%2013 
.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2015) (noting that everyone must attest to at least two years of meaningful use 
in order to advance from Stage One to Stage Two); see also Stage 2, CMS.GOV, 
http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/Stage_2.html (last 
updated Nov. 5, 2014, 3:00 PM) (noting that providers that started participating in 2011 must achieve 
meaningful use in three consecutive years before advancing to Stage Two). 
45 Stage 2, CMS.GOV, http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentive 
Programs/Stage_2.html (last updated Nov. 5, 2014, 3:00 PM). 
46 Neil Versel, CMS Officially Pushes Meaningful Use Stage 3 to 2017, Offers Flexibility in 2014, 
FORBES (Aug. 29, 2014, 5:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/neilversel/2014/08/29/cms-officially-
pushes-meaningful-use-stage-3-to-2017-offers-flexibility-in-2014/.  
47 See Robert Tagalicod & Jacob Reider, Progress on Adoption of Electronic Health Records, 
CMS.GOV, http://www.cms.gov/eHealth/ListServ_Stage3Implementation.html (last updated Dec. 13, 
2013, 12:41 PM) (stating that Stage One focuses on creation of health information, Stage Two focuses 
on exchanging that information, and Stage Three focuses on using that information to improve health 
outcomes). 
48 See EHR Incentives & Certification: How to Attain Meaningful Use, HEALTHIT.GOV, 
http://www.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/how-attain-meaningful-use (last updated Jan. 15, 
2013) [hereinafter How to Attain Meaningful Use] (listing meaningful use criteria for professionals and 
hospitals).  
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id.  
52 Id.  
53 Clinical Quality Measures Basics, CMS.GOV, http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-
Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/ClinicalQualityMeasures.html (last updated Sept. 18, 
2014, 10:48 AM). For a comprehensive summary of all of the core objectives, menu set objectives, and 
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1.  Stage One 
The Stage One meaningful use requirements largely focus on capturing 
information that is relevant to improving patient care and transmitting it 
into a communicable electronic medium.54 Participating health care 
providers must convert patient health records into electronic format for at 
least eighty percent of their patients to meet certain requirements.55 Stage 
One’s core objective requirements mandate that eligible professionals, 
hospitals, and critical access hospitals carry out a number of objectives, 
including but not limited to: implementing computerized provider order 
entry for patients’ medications, providing patients with electronic copies of 
their own records, maintaining up-to-date records for the health status of 
patients, and achieving the capability to communicate with other providers 
regarding a patient’s electronic records.56 On an individual patient level, 
Stage One meaningful use criteria focus on incentivizing eligible providers 
to: (1) convert that patient’s health information into a standard electronic 
format; (2) use the information to track the patient’s clinical conditions; (3) 
convey the information to other providers treating the patient; (4) begin 
reporting clinical quality measures pertaining to that patient’s treatment 
relative to a specific patient population; and (5) use the information to 
involve the patient and family members in making care decisions.57 In 
essence, all of the Stage One requirements standardize health records into 
                                                                                                                          
clinical quality measures, see Medicare & Medicaid EHR Incentive Program: Meaningful Use Stage 1 
Requirements Overview, CMS.GOV 6–18 (2010), available at http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-
Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/Downloads/MU_Stage1_ReqOverview.pdf [hereinafter 
Stage 1 Requirements Overview].  
54 How to Attain Meaningful Use, supra note 48. 
55 For example, for the requirement mandating the provider to maintain an active medication 
allergy list, providers must have recorded at least one entry in electronic format indicating the patient’s 
medication allergies for at least eighty percent of all patients seen by the professional or admitted to the 
hospital. Stage 1 Requirements Overview, supra note 53, at 11.  
56 Specifically, the Stage One core objective requirements require that each eligible professional: 
(1) implement computerized provider order entry for medication orders; (2) conduct drug-drug and 
drug-allergy interaction checks; (3) maintain an up-to-date problem list for current and active 
diagnoses; (4) generate and transmit electronic prescriptions; (5) maintain active medication lists; (6) 
maintain active medication allergy lists; (7) record each patient’s preferred language, gender, race, 
ethnicity, and date of birth; (8) record and chart changes in each patient’s height, weight, blood 
pressure, body mass index, and growth chart status; (9) record smoking status for patients who are 
thirteen years old or older; (10) “[i]mplement one clinical decision support rule relevant to specialty or 
high clinical priority along with the ability to track compliance with that rule”; (11) permit patients to 
view their records online, download, and transmit them within four business days of the information 
being available to the professional; (12) provide clinical summaries for each visit; and (13) “[p]rotect 
electronic health information created or maintained by the certified EHR technology through the 
implementation of appropriate technical capabilities.” Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Eligible 
Professional Meaningful Use Table of Contents Core and Menu Set Objectives: Stage 1 (2014 
Definition), CMS.GOV, http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentiveProg 
rams/Downloads/EP_MU_TableOfContents.pdf (last updated May 2014). 
57 Arthur E. Peabody, Jr., Electronic Health Records: Technology Standards and Incentives for 
Meaningful Use, in HEALTH CARE IT: THE ESSENTIAL LAWYER’S GUIDE TO HEALTH CARE 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW 177, 200 (Arthur Peabody, Jr. ed., 2013).   
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electronic format and thereby make them more portable and accessible for 
numerous parties.  
2.  Stage Two  
On a broader level, Stage Two meaningful use criteria focus on 
facilitating the exchange of patients’ EHRs and increasing patient control 
over their records.58 The Stage Two requirements are similar to their Stage 
One counterparts, but there are seventeen core objective requirements that 
eligible professionals must meet instead of only thirteen.59 Further, the 
Stage Two requirements focus more on enhancing health information 
exchange, increasing requirements for e-prescribing, incorporating lab 
results into certified EHR technology, and establishing more patient 
control over their health information.60 Some noteworthy Stage Two core 
objectives require eligible professionals to: (1) use secure electronic 
messaging with patients to communicate relevant health information to 
them; (2) achieve the capability to submit electronic data to immunization 
registries; and (3) provide patients with the ability to view, download, and 
transmit their health information online within four business days of the 
information being available to the professional.61 The Stage Two core 
objective requirements for hospitals and critical access hospitals are similar 
to their Stage One counterparts, with the exception of several new ones 
that require hospitals to achieve the capability to submit electronic 
reportable laboratory results and electronic syndromic surveillance data to 
public health agencies.62 Further, Stage Two sets forth new menu objective 
requirements, including one that mandates hospitals and professionals to 
record electronic notes in patient records.63 This objective is particularly 
                                                                                                                          
58 See Step 5: Achieve Meaningful Use Stage 2, HEALTHIT.GOV, http://www.healthit.gov/ 
providers-professionals/step-5-achieve-meaningful-use-stage-2 (last updated Apr. 21, 2014) (“The final 
rule for meaningful use Stage 2[] intends to increase health information exchange between providers 
and promote patient engagement by giving patients secure online access to their health information.”).  
59 Eligible Professional’s Guide to Stage 2 of the EHR Incentive Programs, CMS.GOV (Sept. 
2013), http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/Downloads 
/Stage2_Guide_EPs_9_23_13.pdf. 
60 Id.  
61 Stage 2 Eligible Professional (EP) Meaningful Use Core and Menu Measures: Table of 
Contents, CMS.GOV (Oct. 2012), http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EHR 
IncentivePrograms/Downloads/ Stage2_MeaningfulUseSpecSheet_TableContents_EPs.pdf.  
62 Stage 2 Eligible Hospital and Critical Access Hospital (CAH) Meaningful Use Core and Menu 
Objectives: Table of Contents, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES (Oct. 2012), 
http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/Downloads/Stage 
2_MeaningfulUseSpecSheet_TableContents_EligibleHospitals_CAHs.pdf. This is an optional menu 
objective for eligible professionals under Stage Two. Stage 2 Eligible Professional (EP) Meaningful 
Use Core and Menu Measures, supra note 61.  
63 See Stage 2 Eligible Hospital and Critical Access Hospital (CAH) Meaningful Use Core and 
Menu Measures, supra note 62 (giving eligible hospitals the option to fulfill a menu objective by 
recording electronic notes in patient records); see also Stage 2 Eligible Professional (EP) Meaningful 
Use Core and Menu Measures, supra note 61 (giving eligible professionals this same option).  
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relevant for purposes of health care fraud detection.64 
The primary aim of Stage Two meaningful use criteria is to promote a 
nationwide electronic health information exchange.65 The National 
Coordinator asserts that the primary benefit of creating such an exchange is 
that it homogenizes the media through which health information is 
transferred between providers and patients.66 Thus, the Stage-Two 
meaningful use requirements premise the concept of a health information 
exchange upon the electronic standardization of information, which 
presumably enhances a provider’s ability to coordinate treatment. Further, 
EHR technology facilitates the exchange of protected health information in 
several ways, including directed exchange,67 query-based exchange,68 and 
consumer-mediated exchange.69 Theoretically, the various types of 
information exchange systems available under the EHR incentive program 
should enable a wider array of health care providers to use EHRs 
meaningfully and to better coordinate treatment.70 On the other hand, this 
wide array of information-exchange media increases the difficulty of 
determining who is accessing patients’ medical records and for what 
reasons.   
3.  Stage Three  
At the time of this Note’s publication, the federal government has not 
yet officially published the Stage Three requirements, but authorities have 
expressed a preliminary intent to focus the requirements on improving 
quality and safety to ensure better health outcomes, improve population 
health, provide patients with access to self-management tools, and broaden 
                                                                                                                          
64 This is true because of some of the functional characteristics of electronic documentation 
methods, such as copy-paste functions. See Jayne O’Donnell, Feds Push Electronic Records that Make 
Fraud Easier, USA TODAY (July 6, 2014, 10:13 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation 
/2014/07/06/electronic-health-records-medicare-healthcare-fraud-funding/12157645/ (noting how 
recording patient records in electronic format can facilitate fraudulent documentation through the use of 
data cloning). I discuss some functional capabilities of EHRs that may facilitate fraud later in this Note. 
See infra Part III.C. 
65 See Peabody, Jr., supra note 57, at 200 (outlining the basic goals of the meaningful use 
criteria).  
66 See Health Information Exchange (HIE): What Is HIE?, HEALTHIT.GOV, http://www.health 
it.gov/providers-professionals/health-information-exchange/what-hie (last updated May 12, 2014) 
(“Many benefits exist with information exchange regardless of the means of [sic] which is it 
transferred. However, the value of electronically exchanging information is the standardization of data. 
Once standardized, the data transferred can seamlessly integrate into the recipients’ . . . (EHR), further 
improving patient care.”). 
67 Directed exchange is defined as the “ability to send and receive secure information 
electronically between care providers to support coordinated care.” Id.    
68 Query-based exchange is defined as the “ability for providers to find and/or request information 
on a patient from other providers, often used for unplanned care.” Id. 
69 Consumer-mediated exchange is defined as the “ability for patients to aggregate and control the 
use of their health information among providers.” Id. 
70 Id.  
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access to a more patient-centered health information exchange.71 The 
Policy Committee’s Meaningful Use Work Group met in July 2012 to 
make initial policy recommendations for Stage Three.72 One of the group’s 
members, Charlene Underwood, Director of Government and Industry 
Affairs at Siemens Medical, emphasized the need for the Stage Three 
requirements to bring about a “more patient-centric solution.”73 Some 
notable Stage Three goals that the group contemplated include: (1) 
improving the tracking of individual care goals, (2) improving 
documentation of all persons involved in treating the patient, and (3) 
improving patient input in care decisions.74  
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services originally slated 
Stage Three to commence in 2016 but the Centers revised the timeline in 
December of 2013.75 Under this new timeline, Stage Two will extend 
through 2016 and Stage Three will begin in 2017 for those providers who 
have met the Stage Two requirements for at least two years.76 A notice of 
proposed rulemaking for Stage Three was to be released in the fall of 
2014,77 but the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ultimately 
delayed and submitted a public notice of the proposed rule to the Executive 
Office of Management and Budget in January of 2015.78 
                                                                                                                          
71 See Draft Recommendations Meaningful Use Stage 3, MEANINGFUL USE WORK GRP., 
HEALTHIT.GOV 3–6, 19, 23, 58, 60, available at http://www.healthit.gov/FACAS/sites/faca/files/ 
muwg_stage3_draft_rec_07_aug_13_.v3.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2015) (providing various 
recommendations as to how to improve patient outcomes and population health using the robust health 
information database that should be established from completing Stages One and Two). 
72 David Raths, MU Work Group to Make Initial Stage 3 Recommendations in August, 
HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS (July 5, 2012), http://www.healthcare-informatics.com/article/mu-work-
group-make-initial-stage-3-recommendations-august?WA. 
73 Id. 
74 Id.; see Peabody, Jr., supra note 57, at 200 (stating that some Stage Three goals include 
“[d]ecision support for national high-priority conditions[,] . . . [a]ccess to comprehensive patient data 
through patient-centered HIE [health information exchange, and] [i]mproving population health”).   
75 Jon Mertz, CMS Proposes New Timeline or Meaningful Use Stage 2 and Stage 3, HL7 
STANDARDS (Dec. 6, 2013), http://www.hl7standards.com/blog/2013/12/06/cms-proposes-new-
timeline-for-meaningful-use-stage-2-and-stage-3/. 
76 See Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., New CMS Rule Allows Flexibility in 
Certified EHR Technology for 2014 (Aug. 29, 2014), available at http://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/ 
MediaReleaseDatabase/Press-releases/2014-Press-releases-items/2014-08-29.html (“The rule also 
finalizes the extension of Stage 2 through 2016 for certain providers and announces the Stage 3 
timeline, which will begin in 2017 for providers who first became meaningful EHR users in 2011 or 
2012.”). 
77 Tagalicod & Reider, supra note 47; see CMS Issues Final Rule to Extend Meaningful Use 
Requirements, IHEALTHBEAT (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.ihealthbeat.org/articles/2014/9/2/cms-
releases-final-rule-to-extend-meaningful-use-requirements (discussing the potential impact of the 
proposed Stage Three rule on use requirements for health-care providers).   
78 Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Electronic Health Record Incentive Program—Stage 3, 80 
Fed. Reg. 16732 (proposed Mar. 30, 2015) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 495); Philip Peisch, CMS 
Submits Proposed Rule on Stage 3 Meaningful Use to OMB, NAT’L L. REV. (Jan. 13, 2015), 
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/cms-submits-proposed-rule-stage-3-meaningful-use-to-omb.  
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C.  Meaningful Use Enforcement 
Beginning in 2015, eligible professionals who do not meet meaningful 
use requirements will receive reduced Medicare physician fee schedule 
payments.79 This Medicare payment reduction will begin at one percent in 
2015, and it will increase to two percent in 2016 and three percent in 2017 
if the professional continues not to achieve meaningful use of EHRs.80 The 
payment reduction can reach up to a maximum of five percent for a 
Medicare-eligible professional who does not demonstrate meaningful use 
after 2015.81 The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services will also 
begin penalizing eligible hospitals in 2015 if they do not demonstrate 
meaningful use of EHRs by reducing their Medicare payment rate as 
applied in their Inpatient Prospective Payment System.82 Eligible 
professionals and hospitals must report their usage of EHRs annually 
according to the aforementioned meaningful use objectives and clinical 
quality measures in an electronic attestation module.83 The Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services determine whether the eligible 
professional or hospital meets the meaningful use requirements based upon 
their annual attestations.84 If the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services suspect that a provider is making fraudulent attestations, they may 
subject them to an audit.85   
Based upon the incentive payment schedule and the increasingly harsh 
penalties for non-compliance, the EHR Incentive Program is designed to 
make meaningful use of EHRs by all U.S. health care providers a reality. 
While the HITECH Act’s meaningful use requirements are not strict 
insofar as they do not lead to criminal liability for noncompliance, in 
                                                                                                                          
79 Faccenda & Parkin, supra note 16, at 15.  
80 See Peabody, Jr., supra note 57, at 217 (describing penalties that follow from not achieving 
meaningful use).  
81 Medicare and Medicaid EHR Incentive Program Basics, supra note 28.  
82 Peabody, Jr., supra note 57, at 217; see CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DEP’T 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ACUTE CARE HOSPITAL INPATIENT PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM: 
PAYMENT SYSTEM FACT SHEET SERIES, 3 (2013), available at http://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-
Education/Medicare-Learning-Network-MLN/MLNProducts/downloads/AcutePaymtSysfctsht.pdf 
(explaining how the IPPS payment rate for eligible hospitals is determined through a standardized 
formula accounting for various factors such as market conditions, costs associated with treating a 
beneficiary for clinical conditions, and number of readmissions).  
83 For an explanation of meaningful use attestation and an example of the attestation module 
format for eligible professionals, see CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEP’T HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., ATTESTATION USER GUIDE FOR ELIGIBLE PROFESSIONALS: MEDICARE ELECTRONIC 
HEALTH RECORD (EHR) INCENTIVE PROGRAM 4, 17–29 (2014), available at http://www.cms.gov/Reg 
ulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/downloads/EP_Attestation_User_Guide. 
pdf.  
84 See Meaningful Use Attestation, PRACTICE FUSION, http://www.practicefusion.com/meaning 
ful-use-attestation/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2015) (noting that eligible providers must attest to the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services for purposes of meeting meaningful use requirements). 
85 Registration & Attestation, CMS.GOV, http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/ 
Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/RegistrationandAttestation.html (last updated Dec. 29, 2014, 2:48 
PM).   
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theory, the Act’s incentive scheme enforces compliance for the large 
majority of health care providers who receive reimbursement payments 
under Medicare and Medicaid. The widespread use of EHRs is a 
fundamental goal underlying the HITECH Act’s incentive scheme. In this 
vein, it is important to note that the widespread usage of EHRs changes the 
landscape of issues relating to data security and health care fraud.   
D.  The HITECH Act’s Modifications to HIPAA and Security of Protected 
Health Information 
The HITECH Act not only set forth an EHR incentive program, but it 
also implemented several changes to the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), which is the primary federal 
legislation that regulates the exchange of protected health information.86 
Prior to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act’s passage, if a 
covered entity87 under HIPAA contracted with a business associate88 to 
                                                                                                                          
86 See Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, HHS.GOV, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa 
/understanding/summary/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2015) (stating that the HIPAA Privacy Rule, for the first 
time, sets forth national standards for the use and disclosure of protected health information). 
87 Covered entities include health plans, health care clearinghouses, and “[a] health care provider 
who transmits any health information in electronic form in connection with a transaction covered by 
[Subchapter C: Administrative Data Standards and Related Requirements].” 45 C.F.R. § 160.102 
(2013).    
88 Business associates include entities such as third party administrators that assist in claims 
processing, attorneys who counsel health care providers, consultants, medical transcriptionists, and 
health care clearinghouses that translate nonstandard health information into a standardized format. 45 
C.F.R. § 160.103 (2013). This regulation further provides:  
(1) . . . [B]usiness associate means, with respect to a covered entity, a person who: 
(i) On behalf of such covered entity or of an organized health care 
arrangement . . . in which the covered entity participates, but other than in the 
capacity of a member of the workforce of such covered entity or arrangement, 
creates, receives, maintains, or transmits protected health information for a function 
or activity regulated by this subchapter, including claims processing or 
administration, data analysis, processing or administration, utilization review, 
quality assurance, patient safety activities . . . billing, benefit management, practice 
management, and repricing; or (ii) Provides, other than in the capacity of a member 
of the workforce of such covered entity, legal, actuarial, accounting, consulting, data 
aggregation . . . , management, administrative, accreditation, or financial services to 
or for such covered entity, or to or for an organized health care arrangement in 
which the covered entity participates, where the provision of the service involves the 
disclosure of protected health information from such covered entity or arrangement, 
or from another business associate of such covered entity or arrangement, to the 
person. . . . (3) Business associate includes: (i) A Health Information Organization, 
E-prescribing Gateway, or other person that provides data transmission services with 
respect to protected health information to a covered entity and that requires access 
on a routine basis to such protected health information. (ii) A person that offers a 
personal health record to one or more individuals on behalf of a covered entity. (iii) 
A subcontractor that creates, receives, maintains, or transmits protected health 
information on behalf of the business associate. (4) Business associate does not 
include: (i) A health care provider, with respect to disclosures by a covered entity to 
the health care provider concerning the treatment of the individual. (ii) A plan 
sponsor, with respect to disclosures by a group health plan (or by a health insurance 
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perform services that involved the exchange of patients’ health information 
and the business associate disclosed such information,89 the government 
would not enforce HIPAA to punish such disclosure, but the covered entity 
would instead have to sue the business associate directly for breach of 
contract.90 Pursuant to the HITECH Act, business associates—which 
include parties such as third party administrators for claims processing, 
attorneys, consultants, and accounting firms—are now subject to the same 
HIPAA liability as covered entities, meaning that they are subject to direct 
governmental enforcement if they disclose protected health information.91  
Specifically, the HITECH Act mandates that business associates comply 
with the HIPAA Security Rule by maintaining confidentiality of all 
protected health information that they create or handle, protecting against 
unauthorized access of such information, training their employees,92 and 
implementing security measures for protecting such health information.93   
The HITECH Act also subjects business associates to the HIPAA 
                                                                                                                          
issuer or HMO with respect to a group health plan) to the plan sponsor, to the extent 
that the requirements of § 164.504(f) of this subchapter apply and are met. (iii) A 
government agency, with respect to determining for, or enrollment in, a government 
health plan that provides public benefits and is administered by another government 
agency, or collecting protected health information for such purposes, to the extent 
such activities are authorized by law. (iv) A covered entity participating in an 
organized health care arrangement that performs a function or activity as described 
by paragraph (1)(i) of this definition for or on behalf of such organized health care 
arrangement, or that provides a service as described in paragraph (1)(ii) of this 
definition to or for such organized health care arrangement by virtue of such 
activities or services. 
Id.  
89 “Disclosure means the release, transfer, provision of access to, or divulging in any manner of 
information outside the entity holding the information.” Id.  
90 Deven McGraw, Summary of Health Privacy Provisions in the 2009 Economic Stimulus 
Legislation, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. 2 (Apr. 29, 2009), https://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/ 
20090324_ARRAPrivacy.pdf.  
91 See Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification 
Rules Under the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act and the Genetic 
Information Nondiscrimination Act; Other Modifications to the HIPAA Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566, 
5577 (Jan. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 & 164) (“[T]his final rule . . . adopts the 
NPRM proposal to add the term ‘business associate’ to . . . [several] provisions of the Enforcement 
Rule. . . . This is done to implement sections 13401 and 13404 of the Act, which impose direct civil 
money penalty liability on business associates for their violations of certain provisions of the HIPAA 
Rules.”). 
92 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.306(a)(1)–(4) (2013) (“Covered entities and business associates must do 
the following: (1) Ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of all electronic protected health 
information the covered entity or business associate creates, receives, maintains, or transmits. (2) 
Protect against any reasonably anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity of such 
information. (3) Protect against any reasonably anticipated uses or disclosures of such information that 
are not permitted or required under subpart E of this part. (4) Ensure compliance with this subpart by its 
workforce.” (emphasis added) (demonstrating the rules for covered entities)).   
93 See id. §§ 164.308(a)–(b) (setting forth the security specifications that business associates must 
implement in order to comply with HIPAA Security Rule).  
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Privacy Rule,94 which protects patients’ “individually identifiable health 
information”95 from being disclosed or used for purposes other than those 
delineated by the Rule itself or without the patient’s written consent.96 
There are two primary situations in which covered entities are required to 
disclose protected health information: (1) when the individual patient or a 
personal representative requests disclosure; or (2) when the Department of 
Health and Human Services is investigating compliance.97 The Privacy 
Rule also permits disclosure and use of protected health information 
without the patient’s consent in certain situations such as if such actions 
are required for treatment or public health research.98 Similar to the 
Security Rule, the pre-HITECH Act Privacy Rule did not govern business 
associates insofar as they were only required to meet the disclosure 
provisions set forth in their contracts with covered entities.99 The HITECH 
Act modified the Privacy Rule by giving it some teeth: business associates 
now must comply with the Privacy Rule requirements in the same manner 
as the covered entities with which they contract.100 This is a crucial legal 
development in health information security, because business associates of 
covered entities might not be so adept at managing electronic health 
information, yet they are now similarly liable for any misuse or disclosure 
of protected health information.101 Further, the Privacy Rule now requires 
                                                                                                                          
94 Health Information Privacy: The Privacy Rule, HHS.GOV, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/ 
hipaa/administrative/privacyrule/index.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2015).  
95 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2013). This regulation further provides:  
Individually identifiable health information is information that is a subset of health 
information, including demographic information collected from an individual, and: 
(1) Is created or received by a health care provider, health plan, employer, or health 
care clearinghouse; and (2) Relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental 
health or condition of an individual; the provision of health care to an individual; or 
the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care to an individual; 
and (i) That identifies the individual; or (ii) With respect to which there is a 
reasonable basis to believe the information can be used to identify the individual.  
Id. This information is used synonymously with protected health information throughout HIPAA. Id. 
96 See OCR Privacy Brief: Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, HHS.GOV 4 (May 2003), 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/summary/privacysummary.pdf [hereinafter 
Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule] (discussing the basic principle for uses and disclosures of 
protected health information for purposes of the Privacy Rule).  
97 See id. (discussing the required disclosures of protected health information under the Privacy 
Rule).  
98 Id. at 4–5.  
99 See McGraw, supra note 90, at 2 (discussing the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act’s 
modifications to the applicability of HIPAA to business associates of covered entities).   
100 “The additional requirements of this subchapter that relate to privacy and that are made 
applicable with respect to covered entities shall also be applicable to such a business associate and shall 
be incorporated into the business associate agreement between the business associate and the covered 
entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 17934(a) (2012).  
101 See Leon Rodriguez, Enforcing HIPAA in the Age of Electronic Health Records: The View of 
the Office of Civil Rights from Its Director, in HEALTH CARE IT: THE ESSENTIAL LAWYER’S GUIDE TO 
HEALTH CARE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW 301, 303 (Arthur Peabody, Jr. ed., 2013) 
(“HITECH’s extension of liability to business associates improves our compliance efforts by holding 
 
 1122 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1103 
that covered entities and business associates only disclose or use the 
minimum amount of information necessary to achieve the purpose for 
which it is being used.102 This requirement might prove to yield more 
HIPAA violations because business associates may not be as capable as 
covered entities in determining what amount of protected health 
information constitutes the minimum necessary to achieve a health care 
purpose. In addition to subjecting more parties to HIPAA liability, the 
HITECH Act increases requirements for instances where protected health 
information is breached. 
1.  The Data Breach Notification Law 
Along with modifying the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules with 
respect to business associates, the HITECH Act implements new 
requirements for breaches of secure protected health information. The 
HITECH Act establishes a new data breach notification requirement (data 
breach rule) for covered entities and business associates.103 If there is a 
breach of protected health information, the data breach rule mandates that 
the concerned covered entities and business associates must notify the 
Department of Health and Human Services and the individuals whose 
health information was breached.104 A breach occurs when there is an 
“unauthorized acquisition, access, use or disclosure of protected health 
information,”105 but there are also some exceptions to the notification 
requirement.106 Essentially, if the protected health information does not 
leave the business relationship between business associates and covered 
entities or if the information is encrypted, then the data breach rule does 
not apply.107 The data breach rule also requires EHR software vendors to 
notify individual owners of protected health information and the Federal 
Trade Commission if the vendors discover that protected health 
                                                                                                                          
business associates accountable in the same manner as covered entities. Given that many of the most 
serious breaches occur at the business associate level, this change will greatly improve the privacy and 
security of health information.”).    
102 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b) (2013); see Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 96, at 10 
(“A central aspect of the Privacy Rule is the principle of ‘minimum necessary’ use and disclosure.”).  
103 42 U.S.C. § 17932 (2012).  
104 Id. §§ 17932(a)–(b).  
105 McGraw, supra note 90, at 3.  
106 See id. (noting that the breach notification requirement does not apply in situations where the 
unauthorized person receiving protected health information could not have reasonably been expected to 
retain it; where the breach is unintentional within the scope of a professional relationship, and the 
information stays within the relationship; and where the breach is caused inadvertently by a workforce 
member under the authority of the covered entity or business associate, and the information does not 
leave the facility responsible for retaining it); see also Breach Notification for Unsecured Protected 
Health Information, CENTER FOR PRAC. IMPROVEMENT & INNOVATION (Nov. 2009), http://www.am 
ericanehr.com/Libraries/documents/hipaa_breach-notification.sflb.ashx (noting that breach notification 
requirement does not apply in certain situations).  
107 Breach Notification for Unsecured Protected Health Information, supra note 106. 
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information in their software format has been breached.108 Covered entities 
that experience a breach affecting more than five hundred residents of a 
U.S. state or jurisdiction are required to notify popular media outlets in 
such jurisdiction, as well as all affected individuals.109 Covered entities that 
experience such a breach must also notify the Department of Health and 
Human Services immediately,110 which then must publish information 
regarding this breach on its website and report it to Congress.111 In 
explaining its mission, the Office for Civil Rights at the Department of 
Health and Human Services (Health Office for Civil Rights)112 extolled the 
virtues of the data breach rule by noting that it helps government 
authorities in systematically identifying common security vulnerabilities 
associated with protected health information.113 A covered entity’s or 
business associate’s failure to notify the appropriate parties of a data 
breach results in a HIPAA violation, which subjects the entity to a fine that 
accounts for the nature and magnitude of the breach.114 These notification 
requirements do not preempt state data breach requirements unless they are 
contrary to them, meaning that providers might have to meet additional 
notification requirements, depending upon their jurisdiction.115    
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
108 42 U.S.C. §§ 17937(a)(1)–(2) (2012). Once the EHR software vendor has notified the Federal 
Trade Commission, the Commission must then notify the Department of Health and Human Services of 
the breach. Id. § 17937(d). If these notification requirements are not met, such failure will be 
prosecuted as “an unfair and deceptive act or practice in violation of a regulation under section 
[18(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 57a(a)(1)(B))] regarding unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices.” Id. § 17937(e).  
109 Id. § 17932(e)(2); Health Information Privacy: Breach Notification Rule, HHS.GOV, 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/breachnotification rule/ (last visited Feb. 24, 
2015).   
110 McGraw, supra note 90, at 4.  
111 Id.   
112 The Office of Civil Rights is a division of the Department of Health and Human Services that 
is responsible for enforcing laws related to civil rights in the context of health care and health 
information privacy. Office for Civil Rights: OCR’s Mission and Vision, HHS.GOV, http://www.hhs. 
gov/ocr/office/about/mission-vision.html#mission (last visited Jan. 29, 2015).  
113 See Rodriguez, supra note 101, at 302–03 (“We now have a record of the breach notifications 
that we have received. These notifications have offered both OCR and covered entities vital insights 
into the root causes of security vulnerabilities affecting health records. While some breach reports have 
led to enforcement actions, we have utilized breach reports mainly to ensure that the reporting entities 
take corrective action and to deepen our understanding of the operational issues surrounding HIPAA 
compliance.”).  
114 See 42 U.S.C. § 17939(a)(2) (2012) (“Any violation by a covered entity under thus [sic] 
subchapter is subject to enforcement and penalties under section 1176 and 1177 of the Social Security 
Act.”).  
115 McGraw, supra note 90, at 4.   
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2.  Strengthened Security Enforcement  
Another way in which the HITECH Act encourages increased security 
of protected health information is by strengthening the penalties for 
security and privacy violations.116 The Act established a tiered system of 
monetary penalties for providers that commit HIPAA violations.117 At the 
lowest tier, a provider who does not know but should have known by 
“exercising reasonable diligence” that they violated a privacy or security 
provision is fined $100 for each violation.118 At the highest tier, a provider 
who committed a HIPAA violation due to “willful neglect” and did not 
take action to correct it can be subjected to a $50,000 fine for each 
violation.119 The HITECH Act also requires the Department of Health and 
Human Services to conduct periodic audits of covered entities and business 
associates to make sure that they comply with HIPAA requirements.120 
These audits may also lead to enforcement actions, which theoretically 
should bolster health information security through deterrence.121 The 
Health Office for Civil Rights has already begun to conduct audits of 
covered entities to make sure that they have adequate procedures in place 
for handling health information breaches.122     
The HITECH Act’s Omnibus Final Rule123 went into effect on March 
26, 2013 and it grants the Health Office for Civil Rights authority to 
investigate protected health information breaches.124 In addition to setting 
forth the data breach rule and the tiered monetary penalties discussed 
supra, the Omnibus Final Rule also requires covered entities and business 
                                                                                                                          
116 Sarah E. Swank, Enforcement Under HIPAA and HITECH: Why You Need to Worry Again 
About HIPAA, in HEALTH CARE IT: THE ESSENTIAL LAWYER’S GUIDE TO HEALTH CARE 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW 287, 288 (Arthur Peabody, Jr. ed., 2013). 
117 Id. at 288–89. 
118 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5(a) (2012); Swank, supra note 116, at 289 tbl.17.1.   
119 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5(a); Swank, supra note 116, at 289 tbl.17.1.   
120 42 U.S.C. § 17940 (2012). 
121 The former director of the Health Office for Civil Rights, Leon Rodriguez, opined that “the use 
of our audit capability gives us insights into issues that we cannot readily see in our complaint-driven 
investigations but that often are the issues that pose the greatest threat to health information security.” 
Rodriguez, supra note 101, at 303.   
122 See, e.g., Health Information Privacy: HIPAA Privacy, Security, and Breach Notification Audit 
Program, HHS.GOV, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa /enforcement/audit/index.html (last visited 
Jan. 16, 2015) (noting that in 2011, the Health Office for Civil Rights evaluated and assisted over a 
hundred covered entities regarding policies for notifying consumers and the government in the event of 
health information breaches); see also Swank, supra note 116, at 290 (describing the Health Office for 
Civil Rights’ pilot audit program and noting that “[f]or all entities, Security Rule compliance problems 
posed greater difficulties than Privacy Rule compliance problems”).  
123 Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification Rules 
Under the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act and the Genetic 
Information Nondiscrimination Act; Other Modifications to the HIPAA Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566 (Jan. 
25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 & 164). 
124 See Swank, supra note 116, at 292 (explaining the complaint process for notifying the Health 
Office for Civil Rights of a breach and the subsequent investigation that the Office conducts in 
response to such complaints). 
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associates to engage in corrective action plans, which streamline the 
entities’ security procedures with respect to protected health information 
and EHRs.125 Since the Privacy Rule’s initial compliance date in April 
2003, the Health Office for Civil Rights has received over 80,836 HIPAA 
complaints and has resolved 19,726 privacy cases as of April 2013.126 
Some of the most prevalent issues reported in the HIPAA complaints 
included “[i]mpermissible use and disclosures of [protected health 
information],” a lack of security safeguards for electronic protected health 
information, and excessive use of such information for unauthorized 
purposes.127 Many of these complaints—which the Health Office for Civil 
Rights brought against a wide variety of health care providers, including 
large health care conglomerates,128 private practices,129 hospitals,130 and 
government agencies131—developed into enforcement actions that ended in 
settlements.  
The level of government security enforcement related to EHRs 
generally has increased in the wake of the Omnibus Final Rule.132 In the 
pre-HITECH Act era, the Department of Health and Human Services and 
the Department of Justice cooperated with each other to investigate HIPAA 
complaints and to conduct criminal investigations.133 The HITECH Act—
through its data breach notification requirements and audit programs—has 
implemented government regulatory agendas from various angles to 
control HIPAA violations and prosecute criminals in the health care 
field.134 Not only does the HITECH Act increase the enforcement power of 
                                                                                                                          
125 See id. at 293 (describing the corrective action plan’s purpose and goal of enticing health care 
entities to modify EHR policies and procedures that violate HIPAA). 
126 Id.  
127 Id.  
128 See id. at 294 (noting the BlueCross and Blueshield of Tennessee settlement for $1.5 million in 
March of 2012).  
129 See id. at 294–95 (noting the Phoenix Cardiac Surgery, P.C. settlement for $100,000 in April 
of 2012). 
130 See id. at 294 (noting the Hospice of North Idaho settlement for $50,000 in January of 2013). 
131 See id. at 295–96 (noting the Alaska Department of Health and Social Services settlement for 
$1.7 million in October 2009). 
132 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., New Rule Protects Patient Privacy, 
Secures Health Information (Jan. 17, 2013), available at  http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2013pres 
/01/20130117b.html (“The final omnibus rule . . . strengthens the government’s ability to enforce 
[HIPAA].”).  
133 Swank, supra note 116, at 288. 
134 See id. (“The HITECH Act added an audit protocol that gave OCR affirmative authority to 
audit covered entities and business associates. In addition, the HITECH Act clarified DOJ’s authority 
to prosecute federal criminal activity related to HIPAA, while extending enforcement authority for civil 
violations of HIPAA to the state attorneys general. Finally, the HITECH Act expanded those entities 
directly regulated under HIPAA to include business associates, who previously contractually agreed to 
HIPAA compliance through business associate agreements with covered entities. Enforcement of the 
violation of federal statutory protections by covered entities and business associates will only increase 
with the Omnibus Final Rule, which went into effect on March 26, 2013. All these provisions evidence 
an intent to protect PHI and the privacy of individuals served by health care providers across the 
nation.”).   
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federal authorities, but it also grants state attorneys general the authority to 
enforce HIPAA regulations related to privacy and security of protected 
health information.135 Further, state attorneys general have authority to 
enforce state laws with respect to protected health information,136 but the 
Department of Justice is primarily responsible for prosecuting criminal 
cases related to HIPAA.137 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation also retains authority to 
investigate and prosecute fraud and other criminal activities in the health 
care field.138 In light of the HITECH Act’s focus on promoting increased 
enforcement against health care fraud and HIPAA violations, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation formed a partnership with the Department of 
Health and Human Services139 and the Department of Justice called the 
HHS Health Care Fraud Prevention and Enforcement Action Team Task 
Force.140 One of the first criminal convictions for a HIPAA violation after 
the HITECH Act occurred in April 2010, when the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation concluded an investigation into a former UCLA Healthcare 
System employee who—after being discharged—had illegally read EHRs 
of celebrities and high-profile patients.141 The former employee pleaded 
guilty to four misdemeanor counts of violating the HIPAA Privacy Rule 
and was sentenced to four months in federal prison.142 Despite the 
HITECH Act’s enhancement of HIPAA enforcement and implementation 
of security measures, breaches of protected health information still occur 
on a wide scale throughout the United States. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
135 Id. at 296; see 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5(d) (2012) (“[I]n any case in which the attorney general of a 
State has reason to believe that an interest of one or more of the residents of that State has been or is 
threatened or adversely affected by any person who violates a provision of this part, the attorney 
general of the State, as parens patriae, may bring a civil action on behalf of such residents of the State 
in a district court of the United States . . . (A) to enjoin further such violation by the defendant; or (B) 
to obtain damages on behalf of such residents of the State . . . .’”). For a discussion of parens patriae 
standing in relation to other standing doctrines, see generally Kaitlin Ainsworth Caruso, Associational 
Standing for Cities, 47 CONN. L. REV. 59 (2014). 
136 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5(d)(5) (“For purposes of bringing any civil action under paragraph (1), 
nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent an attorney general of a State from exercising the 
powers conferred on the attorney general by the laws of that State.”); Swank, supra note 116, at 296–97 
(noting that the HITECH Act encourages state attorneys general to cooperate with the Health Office for 
Civil Rights in enforcing the security of protected health information).  
137 Swank, supra note 116, at 297.   
138 See id. at 298 (noting that the Federal Bureau of Investigation retains special units and field 
offices across the country to investigate crime and fraud in the health care industry).   
139 Specifically, the Office of the Inspector General. Id.  
140 Id.   
141 Id. at 299.   
142 Id.   
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3.  Data Breaches Abound 
The HITECH Act’s data breach rule fosters accountability for misuse 
or loss of protected health information, but it has not stopped these 
problems from occurring in the first place. Loss or theft of mobile 
electronic devices is a primary way in which data breaches occur within 
the ambit of the HITECH Act. Some common examples include: backup 
tapes, desktop or laptop computers, and computer components containing 
EHRs being lost by or stolen from the health care provider.143 In 
September 2011, 4.6 million records were breached when backup tapes 
were stolen from government health care organizations.144 In February 
2011, 1.7 million records were breached when backup tapes were stolen 
from Jacobi Medical Center in Bronx, New York.145 In October 2011, 1.6 
million records were breached when three backup tapes went missing from 
Nemours, a children’s health organization in Delaware.146 In April 2012, 
315,000 records were breached when ten backup tapes were stolen from 
Emory University Hospital in Georgia.147 In March 2011, 300,000 records 
were breached when backup tapes were stolen from the Cord Blood 
Registry.148   
As for desktop or laptop computers, 4.2 million records were breached 
in November 2011 when a desktop computer was stolen from Sutter 
Physicians Service and Foundation in California.149 In September 2009, 1 
million records were breached when a computer was stolen from the 
Oklahoma Department of Human Services.150 In October 2009, 850,000 
records were breached when a laptop was stolen from BlueCross 
BlueShield/Highmark.151 In April 2011, 514,000 records were breached 
when a computer was stolen from the Eisenhower Medical Center in 
California,152 and 133,000 records were breached when a laptop was stolen 
                                                                                                                          
143 Two million records were breached in March 2011 when HealthNet and IBM lost server drives 
in California. Lucy L. Thomson, Health Care Data Breaches and Information Security: Addressing 
Threats and Risks to Patient Data, in HEALTH CARE IT: THE ESSENTIAL LAWYER’S GUIDE TO HEALTH 
CARE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW 253, 255–56 (Arthur Peabody, Jr. ed., 2013). One 
and a half million records were breached in November 2009 when HealthNet lost portable hard drives 
in Connecticut. Id. A million records were breached in October 2009 when hard drives went missing 
from BlueCross BlueShield in Tennessee. Id. Eight hundred thousand records were breached in March 
2012 when computer devices were lost at the California Department of Child Support. Id. In April 
2011, 93,500 records were breached when hard drives were lost at the Mid-State Medical Center in 
Connecticut. Id. Fifty thousand records were breached in March 2013 when a contractor of the North 
Carolina Department of Health and Human Services lost a thumb drive. Id.  
144 Id. at 256. 
145 Id.  
146 Id.  
147 Id.  
148 Id.  
149 Id.     
150 Id.  
151 Id.  
152 Id.  
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from the Oklahoma Department of Health.153 In February 2011, 84,000 
records were breached when a computer was stolen from the Saint Francis 
Hospital in Oklahoma.154 In November 2011, 63,000 records were 
breached when a laptop was stolen from the Neurological Institute of 
Savannah in Georgia.155 In January 2013, 57,000 records were breached 
when a laptop was stolen from the Stanford University Children’s Hospital 
in California.156 In March 2012, 34,500 records were breached when a 
laptop was stolen from Howard University Hospital in Washington, D.C.157  
These reported breaches demonstrate that the ability to store copious 
amounts of data electronically in one device can be a gift and a curse. An 
employee simply losing a thumb drive can cause tens of thousands of 
EHRs to end up in an identity thief’s possession.158 The data breach rule 
incentivizes health care providers to be wary of such possible breaches and 
it encourages them to adopt security measures to prevent a breach or at 
least soften the repercussions arising from it. 
The HITECH Act’s changes to HIPAA liability are meant to bolster 
security and privacy measures for entities managing patient EHRs, but the 
Act’s encouragement of increased enforcement and its establishment of a 
larger liability net may actually muddy the waters of health care fraud. 
Specifically, given that business associates and covered entities must now 
exercise more efforts to protect and manage EHRs, providers with 
fraudulent intentions might be able to point the finger at other parties in 
order to shield themselves from their own malfeasance. When the HITECH 
Act’s increased liability net is coupled with the EHR incentive program 
that encourages more information exchange and increased patient access to 
protected health information, fraudsters have even more parties to blame 
for inconsistencies in medical records. For example, if federal authorities 
investigate a doctor who fraudulently bills Medicare on a routine basis, the 
doctor might defend himself by contending that another party such as the 
patient, herself, or a third party billing administrator—who now all have 
increased access to patient EHRs in the wake of the HITECH Act—was 
responsible for causing a glitch in the patient’s EHR record that led to the 
higher amount being billed. Investigators of health care fraud should be 
cognizant of instances like these where the HITECH Act and increased use 
of EHRs changes the landscape for security and fraud liability.  
                                                                                                                          
153 Id.  
154 Id.  
155 Id.  
156 Id.  
157 Id.  
158 See id. (discussing the effects of a March 2013 breach at the North Carolina Department of 
Health and Human Services).   
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III.  ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS AND THE                                                 
NEW TOPOGRAPHY OF HEALTH CARE FRAUD 
The HITECH Act’s EHR incentive program, meaningful use 
requirements, and HIPAA modifications strive to achieve better quality 
and coordination in health care. Yet, the EHR agenda that the Act 
advances—as well as its subjecting more parties to liability for breaches of 
protected health information—will significantly alter the landscape of 
fraud detection. Some policymakers, prosecutors, and commentators 
express concern over the ways in which EHRs may assist health care 
providers to commit fraud because the HITECH Act does not thoroughly 
address this issue.159 Although the HITECH Act strengthens law 
enforcement efforts with respect to medical identity theft and protection of 
patients’ EHRs, it does not address some of the new legal problems that its 
desired outcomes may manifest. One such problem that will come to the 
forefront in the Act’s wake is the increased burden on prosecutors and 
auditors to detect fraud in EHRs.  
A.  Health Care Fraud: Civil Penalties Under the False Claims Act 
The primary legislation that punishes perpetrators of health care fraud 
is the False Claims Act,160 a statute originally enacted during the Civil 
War-era that Congress has broadened to encompass a wide array of 
fraudulent activity against the federal government.161 Section 3729 of the 
False Claims Act allows for treble damages and imposes a $5,000 to 
$10,000 fine upon any person who, inter alia, “knowingly presents, or 
                                                                                                                          
159 See, e.g., Mike Miliard, Providers Respond to Holder, Sebelius on ‘Troubling Indications’ of 
EHR Fraud, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/ 
providers-respond-holder-sebelius-troubling-indications-ehr-fraud (noting that U.S. Attorney General 
Eric Holder and Health and Human Services Secretary Kathleen Sebelius warned against using EHRs 
for fraudulent purposes and reporting that some health care professionals expressed dissatisfaction over 
the lack of guidance from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services concerning protection 
against EHR fraud); OIG: CMS Should Improve Efforts to Detect, Prevent Fraud in EHRs, 
IHEALTHBEAT (May 29, 2014), http://www.ihealthbeat.org/articles/2014/5/29/oig-cms-should-
improve-efforts-to-detect-prevent-fraud-in-ehrs (“The Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT 
and CMS should develop a comprehensive plan to better address fraud vulnerabilities in electronic 
health records, according to a report released Tuesday by the HHS Office of the Inspector 
General . . . .”). 
160 False Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1621 (1863) (codified as amended at 31 
U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2012)). 
161 See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40785, QUI TAM: THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 
AND RELATED FEDERAL STATUTES 5–8 (Aug. 6, 2009) (discussing the origins and development of the 
False Claims Act as of 2009); see also Joan H. Krause, “Promises to Keep”: Health Care Providers 
and the Civil False Claims Act, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1363, 1369–70 (2002) (“The FCA was enacted in 
1863 in response to ‘rampant fraud’ perpetrated on the Union Army during the Civil War. Almost 140 
years later, multiple amendments have expanded the law beyond its modest military origins to 
encompass virtually any individual or entity that transacts business with the federal government. The 
current version of the FCA prohibits a variety of fraudulent activities involving government funds.” 
(internal citations omitted)).  
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causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or 
approval” or who makes a materially false statement to the government.162 
Thus, the False Claims Act can subject offenders to significant monetary 
penalties, especially those who are health care providers submitting 
thousands of claims per year to the federal government through programs 
like Medicare and Medicaid.163 The False Claims Act allows for parties to 
bring qui tam actions,164 which permit whistleblowers165 to sue perpetrators 
of fraud on behalf of the government.166 The False Claims Act’s allowance 
                                                                                                                          
162 See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2012) (“[A]ny person who—(A) knowingly presents, or causes to 
be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval; (B) knowingly makes, uses, or causes 
to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim; (C) conspires to 
commit a violation of subparagraph (A), (B), (D), (E), (F), or (G); (D) has possession, custody, or 
control of property or money used, or to be used, by the Government and knowingly delivers, or causes 
to be delivered, less than all of that money or property; . . . or (G) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to 
be made or used, a false record or statement material to an obligation to pay or transmit money or 
property to the Government, or knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly avoids or decreases 
an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government, is liable to the United States 
Government for a civil penalty of not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000, . . . plus 3 times the 
amount of damages which the Government sustains because of the act of that person.”); see also id. § 
3729(b) (“For purposes of this section—(1) the terms ‘knowing’ and ‘knowingly’ —(A) mean that a 
person, with respect to information—(i) has actual knowledge of the information; (ii) acts in deliberate 
ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; or (iii) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or 
falsity of the information; and (B) require no proof of specific intent to defraud; (2) the term ‘claim’—
(A) means any request or demand, whether under a contract or otherwise, for money or property and 
whether or not the United States has title to the money or property, that—(i) is presented to an officer, 
employee, or agent of the United States; or (ii) is made to a contractor, grantee, or other recipient, if the 
money or property is to be spent or used on the Government’s behalf or to advance a Government 
program or interest, and if the United States Government—(I) provides or has provided any portion of 
the money or property requested or demanded; or (II) will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or other 
recipient for any portion of the money or property which is requested or demanded; and (B) does not 
include requests or demands for money or property that the Government has paid to an individual as 
compensation for Federal employment or as an income subsidy with no restrictions on that individual’s 
use of the money or property; (3) the term ‘obligation’ means an established duty, whether or not fixed, 
arising from an express or implied contractual, grantor-grantee, or licensor-licensee relationship, from a 
fee-based or similar relationship, from statute or regulation, or from the retention of any overpayment; 
and (4) the term “material” means having a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, 
the payment or receipt of money or property.”). 
163 See Krause, supra note 161, at 1370 (describing how health care providers can be subjected to 
much larger fines under the False Claims Act than other typical offenders like defense contractors 
because of the nature of health care providers’ business). 
164 Qui tam actions allow private citizens to bring civil actions against defendants in order to 
enforce a federal statute. Thus, while private citizens bring these actions, they are essentially brought 
on behalf of the U.S. government as well. See Evan Caminker, Comment, The Constitutionality of Qui 
Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341, 341 (1989) (“The qui tam action offers an unconventional means by 
which Congress may enlist the aid of private citizens in enforcing Federal statutory schemes. In such an 
action, a private person maintains a civil proceeding on behalf of both herself and the United States to 
recover damages and/or to enforce penalties available under a statute prohibiting specified conduct. 
The private plaintiff shares any monetary recovery with the United States.” (internal citation omitted)).   
165 They are also referred to as “relators” under the False Claims Act. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3733(a)(1) (2012) (“Any information obtained by the Attorney General or a designee of the Attorney 
General under this section may be shared with any qui tam relator if the Attorney General or designee 
determine it is necessary as part of any false claims act investigation.” (footnote omitted)).   
166 Id. Further, “[a] person may bring a civil action for a violation of section 3729 for the person 
and for the United States Government. The action shall be brought in the name of the Government.” Id. 
§ 3730(b)(1). 
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for qui tam actions has greatly extended the government’s fraud 
enforcement capacity, primarily because whistleblowers can receive a 
percentage of any monetary penalties that offenders have to pay.167 
Furthermore, Congress recently amended the False Claims Act in its 2009 
Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act.168 One major consequence of these 
2009 amendments was Congress’s expansion of liability to encompass 
parties who failed to reimburse the government for prior overpayment. 
Thus, whereas the pre-2009 False Claims Act only made parties liable once 
they presented a claim to get payment from the government, the post-2009 
False Claims Act now covers those parties who knowingly avoid paying 
back the government.169 In this light, the government is employing new 
tactics to track down and punish fraudsters. Nonetheless, it needs to double 
its efforts, because fraud still runs rampant.  
The principles of the False Claims Act—and the Act’s provision of qui 
tam actions—aim to enhance government efforts in detecting and deterring 
health care fraud, but many of the parties who actually blow the whistle 
under the Act have ulterior motives.170 While some whistleblower claims 
                                                                                                                          
167 See id. §§ 3730(d)(1)–(2) (“(1) If the Government proceeds with an action brought by a person 
under subsection (b), such person shall, subject to the second sentence of this paragraph, receive at least 
15 percent but not more than 25 percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement of the claim, 
depending upon the extent to which the person substantially contributed to the prosecution of the 
action. Where the action is one which the court finds to be based primarily on disclosures of specific 
information (other than information provided by the person bringing the action) relating to allegations 
or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or 
Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, the 
court may award such sums as it considers appropriate, but in no case more than 10 percent of the 
proceeds, taking into account the significance of the information and the role of the person bringing the 
action in advancing the case to litigation. Any payment to a person under the first or second sentence of 
this paragraph shall be made from the proceeds. Any such person shall also receive an amount for 
reasonable expenses which the court finds to have been necessarily incurred, plus reasonable attorneys’ 
fees and costs. All such expenses, fees, and costs shall be awarded against the defendant. (2) If the 
Government does not proceed with an action under this section, the person bringing the action or 
settling the claim shall receive an amount which the court decides is reasonable for collecting the civil 
penalty and damages. The amount shall be not less than 25 percent and not more than 30 percent of the 
proceeds of the action or settlement and shall be paid out of such proceeds. Such person shall also 
receive an amount for reasonable expenses which the court finds to have been necessarily incurred, 
plus reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. All such expenses, fees, and costs shall be awarded against 
the defendant.” (footnote omitted)); see also HOYT W. TORRAS, HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE: A 
PHYSICIAN’S GUIDE TO COMPLIANCE 67 (2d ed. 2003) (“Qui tam plaintiffs—sometimes referred to as 
relators and whistle-blowers—may personally receive 10% to 30% of the total recovery plus reasonable 
attorney fees. The actual percentage is determined by the court, and there are certain maximums 
depending on whether the government participates in the case.”). 
168 Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009) (codified as amended in various sections of 18 and 
31 U.S.C.).  
169 See Daniel C. Lumm, Comment, The 2009 “Clarifications” to the False Claims Act of 1863: 
The All-Purpose Antifraud Statute with the Fun Qui Tam Twist, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 527, 541–42 
(2010) (discussing how the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act modified the language in 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3729(a)(2) to reflect that it is not required that the defendant present a claim for payment from the 
government in order for liability to attach).   
170 See TORRAS, supra note 167, at 68 (noting that the majority of qui tam actions filed against 
defendants under the False Claims Act are brought by disgruntled employees, spouses or significant 
others, and competitors).   
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are meritorious, many of them are not the product of a plaintiff’s legitimate 
intent to expose fraud.171 Nevertheless, False Claims Act whistleblower 
actions continue to expose a substantial amount of fraudulent activity in 
the health care industry. Specifically, a 2013 report indicated that the 
Department of Justice recovered nearly $5 billion in the 2012 fiscal year 
and $3.8 billion in the 2013 fiscal year through False Claims Act actions, 
$2.6 billion of which arose from health care fraud recovery in 2013.172 
Experience and statistics show that False Claims Act qui tam actions 
enable the federal government to recover a huge amount of money that 
perpetrators of health care fraud unlawfully withhold from it.173 The annual 
increases in funds recovered from False Claims Act actions suggest that 
these actions are an important mechanism for government restitution, but 
the increases also demonstrate that the government is still failing to deter a 
large number of fraud perpetrators. 
In a False Claims Act whistleblower action, the government or relator 
carries the burden of proof and must prove all elements and damages by a 
preponderance of the evidence.174 The United States or relator must prove 
that the government’s claim for payment was made and that the claim was 
false or fraudulent.175 Courts have split on what level of intent is required 
for proving liability in a False Claims Act action,176 but the general 
                                                                                                                          
171 See id. at 68–69 (“An obvious danger in these suits is that disgruntled employees can blow 
things out of proportion, fabricate activities, or notify the government of their own improper activities 
that occurred without the physician’s knowledge. Similarly, patients might pursue a case because they 
do not understand a billing statement. . . . It is hoped that attorneys soliciting business will weed out the 
real cases from those without merit.”).   
172 A. Brian Albritton, DOJ Announces $3.8 Billion in False Claim Act Recoveries for FY 2013, 
FALSE CLAIMS ACT L. BLOG (Jan. 6, 2014, 11:33 PM), http://www.falseclaimsactlawblog.com/2014 
/01/doj-announces-38-billion-in-false-claim.html (citing Justice News: Justice Department Recovers 
$3.8 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2013, DEP’T. OF JUST.: OFF. OF PUB. AFFAIRS 
(Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/December/13-civ-1352.html).  
173 See Mary Jane Wilmoth, DOJ Secures Second Largest Annual Recovery from False Claims 
Cases in 2013, WHISTLEBLOWERS PROTECTION BLOG (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.whistle 
blowersblog.org/2014/01/articles/false-claims/doj-secures-second-largest-annual-recovery-from-false-
claims-cases-in-2013/ (“Since the inclusion of the Qui Tam provision the detection and prevention of 
fraud has risen exponentially. In 1986, prior to the reform, the U.S. government recovered 89 million 
dollars from detecting and prosecuting fraud. In 2012, that number rose to 4.95 billion dollars, 68% of 
that money was recovered via Qui Tam actions.”). 
174 31 U.S.C. § 3731(d) (2012).   
175 78 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 4 (2004).  
176 Compare United States v. Triple Canopy, Inc., 775 F.3d 628, 634 (4th Cir. 2015) (positing that 
False Claims Act liability requires scienter, which “encompasses actual knowledge, deliberate 
indifference, and reckless disregard, but does not require proof of specific intent to defraud”), with 
United States ex rel. Schumann v. Astrazeneca Pharms. L.P., 769 F.3d 837, 840–41, 845–46 (3d Cir. 
2014) (concluding that requisite intent is knowledge), and United States v. Bollinger Shipyards, Inc., 
775 F.3d 255, 259–60 (5th Cir. 2014) (“To meet the ‘requisite scienter’ requirement, the United States 
must plead that [defendant] acted with knowledge of the falsity of the statement, which is defined, at a 
minimum, as acting in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information.’”) (quoting 31 
U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2012)), and United States ex rel. Grenadyor v. Ukrainian Vill. Pharmacy, 
Inc., 772 F.3d 1102, 1105 (7th Cir. 2014) (concluding that the requisite intent is that the defendant 
know the claim is false), and United States v. Aleff, 772 F.3d 508, 511 (8th Cir. 2014) (concluding that 
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consensus is that the plaintiff must prove that the defendant had actual 
knowledge that he was presenting a claim to the government that he knew 
to be false.177 The plaintiff does not have to prove that the defendant had a 
specific intent to defraud the government to establish liability, but it also 
cannot rest its proof on the proposition that a defendant should have known 
that the claim was fraudulent.178 Thus, the less stringent preponderance-of-
the-evidence burden for the government may alleviate the difficulty of 
proving a False Claims Act violation, but the knowledge element can be 
particularly difficult to prove. A health care provider’s recording clinical 
notes in electronic format can aggravate this difficulty.  
B.  Health Care Fraud: Criminal Penalties 
Federal health care fraud offenses can carry a maximum punishment of 
life imprisonment179 and can subject offenders to significant fines as 
well.180 Health care providers may be convicted for actions such as 
falsifying EHR clinical notes, billing for procedures not actually 
performed, billing more than once for the same service, and billing for a 
provided service that resulted in an improper kickback to a referral 
source.181 Prosecutors may charge numerous statutory violations to 
                                                                                                                          
requisite intent “includes actual knowledge, deliberate ignorance, or reckless disregard”), and Gonzalez 
v. Planned Parenthood of Los Angeles, 759 F.3d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2014) (“The FCA specifically 
takes aim at knowing falsity, not at negligent misrepresentation.”). 
177 78 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 4 (2004). 
178 Id.   
179 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (2012) provides, inter alia, that “if the [health care fraud] violation results in 
death, such person [offender] shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years or for 
life, or both.” Id.   
180 See, e.g., id. (“(a) Whoever knowingly and willfully executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme 
or artifice—(1) to defraud any health care benefit program; or (2) to obtain, by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, any of the money or property owned by, or under the 
custody or control of, any health care benefit program, in connection with the delivery of or payment 
for health care benefits, items, or services, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 
years, or both. If the violation results in serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title), 
such person shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both; and if the 
violation results in death, such person shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years 
or for life, or both. (b) With respect to violations of this section, a person need not have actual 
knowledge of this section or specific intent to commit a violation of this section.”); see also id. § 
1035(a) (“Whoever, in any matter involving a health care benefit program, knowingly and willfully—
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact; or (2) makes any 
materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any materially 
false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent 
statement or entry, in connection with the delivery of or payment for health care benefits, items, or 
services, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.”).  
181 Compliance Policies: Federal and State False Claims Information, U. MD. REHABILITATION 
& ORTHOPAEDIC INST., http://www.umrehabortho.org/compliance/fed-state_false_claim_info.htm (last 
visited Jan. 13, 2015); see REBECCA SALTIEL BUSCH, HEALTHCARE FRAUD: AUDITING AND 
DETECTION GUIDE 40–41 (2d ed. 2012) (listing various forms of provider-side health care fraud, 
including clustering, improper modifier codes, kickbacks, and patient dumping); see generally Susan P. 
Hanson & Bonnie S. Cassidy, Fraud Control: New Tools, New Potential, 77 J. AHIMA 24 (Mar. 
2006), available at http://library.ahima.org/xpedio/groups/public/documents/ahima/bok1_030850. 
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penalize health care fraud, but HIPAA established several specific health 
care fraud crimes in various sections of Title 18 of the United States 
Code.182 While prosecutors have discretion as to which statutory violation 
to charge a perpetrator of health care fraud with committing, Section 1347 
of Title 18 is often broadly applicable. In order to prove a Section 1347 
violation, a prosecutor must prove, inter alia, that the defendant 
“knowingly and willfully execute[d], or attempt[ed] to execute, a scheme 
or artifice . . . to defraud any health care benefit program . . . in connection 
with the delivery of or payment for health care benefits, items, or 
services.”183 The elements of proof are similar to proving a violation of the 
mail fraud statute,184 but they are specific to health care services. Unlike 
proving a False Claims Act violation, the prosecutor must prove each 
element of a Section 1347 offense beyond a reasonable doubt.185 Prior to 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010,186 prosecutors had 
to prove that the defendant had a specific intent to defraud to convict him 
                                                                                                                          
hcsp?dDocName=bok1_030850 (noting that some examples of health care fraud include providers 
making healthy patients come in for unnecessary visits, submitting claims to Medicare for services 
more expensive than those actually provided, submitting claims for procedures or visits that never took 
place, and prescribing multiple medications to patients who doctor-shop). 
182 See 18 U.S.C. § 669(a) (2012) (“Whoever knowingly and willfully embezzles, steals, or 
otherwise without authority converts to the use of any person other than the rightful owner, or 
intentionally misapplies any of the moneys, funds, securities, premiums, credits, property, or other 
assets of a health care benefit program, shall be fined . . . or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or 
both . . . .”); id. § 1035(a) (criminalizing false statements relating to health care); id. § 1347 
(criminalizing fraud in the context of provision or payment for health care benefits); id. § 1518(a) 
(“Whoever willfully prevents, obstructs, misleads, delays or attempts to prevent, obstruct, mislead, or 
delay the communication of information or records relating to a violation of a Federal health care 
offense to a criminal investigator shall be fined . . . or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.”); see 
also Tim Drake et al., Health Care Fraud, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1131, 1173 (2013) (discussing 
HIPAA’s establishment of federal felonies and misdemeanors related to health care fraud). Section 
1347 is labeled as “health care fraud,” Section 669 is labeled as “theft or embezzlement in connection 
with health care,” Section 1035 is labeled as “false statements relating to health care matters” and 
Section 1518 is labeled as “obstruction of criminal investigations of health care offenses . . . .” Id.  
183 18 U.S.C. § 1347(a) (2012) (emphasis added); Ellen Podgor, The Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act of 2010 Reduces the Criminal Mens Rea Requirement for Healthcare Fraud and 
Increases Penalties Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, WHITE COLLAR CRIME PROF BLOG 
(Sept. 6, 2010), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime_blog/2010/09/the-patient-
protection-and-affordable-care-act-of-2010-reduces-the-criminal-mens-rea-requirement-for.html; see 
Drake et al., supra note 182, at 1173 (citing United States v. Hunt, 521 F.3d 636, 645 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(stating the elements required to prove a Section 1347 violation)). 
184 See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012) (providing that it shall be a crime to commit mail fraud); Samuel 
A. Newman & Robert G. Kidwell, Mail and Wire Fraud, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 707, 710–11 (2000) 
(“[T]o convict a defendant for violating § 1341, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant perpetrated (1) a scheme to defraud, (2) with the intent to defraud, (3) while using 
the United States mails or a private interstate commercial carrier to further that scheme.”). 
185  See Model Criminal Jury Instructions: Fraud Offenses – Mail, Wire, Bank and Health Care 
(18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1344, 1347), U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 39 (2014), 
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/sites/ca3/files/2013%20Chap%206%20Fraud%20Offenses%20final%20r
evision%202%202014.pdf (providing the elements and standard of proof for proving a Section 1347 
violation).  
186 Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20, 
21, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 36, and 42 U.S.C.). 
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under Section 1347.187 The Affordable Care Act abrogated the specific 
intent requirement, but prosecutors still have to meet the difficult burden of 
proving that a defendant executed a “scheme or artifice to defraud.”188 
Thus, a prosecutor may have less difficulty proving health care fraud 
insofar as she does not have to prove specific intent, but EHRs can still 
make a prosecutor’s job difficult in proving a scheme or artifice to defraud. 
C.  Electronic Disguises of Health Care Fraud 
By design, the HITECH Act’s EHR incentive and meaningful use 
programs encourage the widespread use of EHR software among health 
care providers. In certain instances, these programs also expressly 
encourage health care providers to alter their standard practices in ways 
that upend traditional fraud detection. For example, the Stage Two 
meaningful use menu objective that requires eligible hospitals to record 
electronic progress notes in patient records might make detection of 
language suggesting a scheme to defraud more difficult.189 Thus, when 
such legislative initiatives expressly encourage providers to use functional 
characteristics of EHR technology in ways that change the format of 
traditional practices, fraudsters whose practices were becoming more 
apparent on paper might seize the opportunity to switch to using new 
electronic techniques, requiring prosecutors to go back to square one. At 
the very least, prosecutors will have to reassess their strategies. As one 
former prosecutor indicated in a recent interview concerning EHRs, some 
                                                                                                                          
187 See Podgor, supra note 183 (explaining how the Affordable Care Act loosened the proof of 
intent requirement for health care fraud convictions). 
188 See 42 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012) (“[T]he term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or 
artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.”); see also United States v. Colton, 
231 F.3d 890, 901 (4th Cir. 2000) (discussing the essential proof of mail, bank, wire, and health care 
fraud cases and noting that “[w]hat is essential is proof of a ‘scheme or artifice to defraud,’ which can 
be shown by deceptive acts or contrivances intended to hide information, mislead, avoid suspicion, or 
avert further inquiry into a material matter”); Podgor, supra note 183 (noting that prosecutors still have 
to prove that a defendant employed a scheme or artifice to defraud in order to establish guilt).   
189 See Stage 2 Eligible Hospital and Critical Access Hospital (CAH) Meaningful Use Core and 
Menu Objectives, supra note 62 (requiring eligible hospitals to record electronic notes in patient 
records). Specifically, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services require that eligible hospitals’ 
emergency and inpatient departments record at least one electronic progress note for more than thirty 
percent of “unique” patients during its reporting period. Stage 2 Eligible Hospital and Critical Access 
Hospital Meaningful Use Menu Set Measures Measure 2 of 6, CMS.GOV (Oct. 2012), 
http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/downloads/Stage2 
_HospitalMenu_2_ElectronicNotes.pdf. Further, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services state 
that electronic notes are “[d]efined as electronic progress notes. CMS will rely on providers own 
determinations and guidelines defining when progress notes are necessary to communicate individual 
patient circumstances and for coordination with previous documentation of patient observations, 
treatments, and/or results in the [EHR].” Id. An example of handwritten notes that might suggest fraud 
occurs where a physician writes the exact same things in his clinical notes for multiple patients without 
any variation whatsoever. See Christie Moon & Christina Matsiga, 7 Red Flags for Fraud in Medical 
Records, ADVANCE HEALTHCARE NETWORK (Feb. 23, 2011), http://health-information.advanceweb 
.com/Features/Articles/7-Red-Flags-for-Fraud-in-Medical-Records.aspx (presenting examples of fraud 
in medical notes).  
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of the automated capabilities of EHR technology, like data-cloning, can 
encourage fraud.190 Although some of the functional capabilities of 
EHRs—such as cloning, auto-population, and cyber portability—facilitate 
efficient and intelligent health care, these capabilities may actually 
incentivize some providers to shirk documentation responsibilities. Worse 
yet, these capabilities may mask fraudulent practices in unprecedented 
ways, making it more difficult for auditors and prosecutors to weed out 
perpetrators of health care fraud.   
1.  Copy-Paste/Cloning Functions 
Instead of having to fill out preliminary information about a particular 
patient for each separate visit or medical exam, the copy-paste features of 
EHRs allow physicians, nurses, and employees to copy information in a 
patient’s record from a previous visit and paste it into a new record for a 
later visit.191 This is merely one example of how a health care professional 
may utilize copy-paste features. The copy-paste function is true to form for 
many technological innovations: it is a bonus for improving efficiency and 
lowering the cost of health care, but it is also a new potential source for 
error and fraud.192  
Despite its efficiency benefits, the copy-paste function of EHR 
technology can cause providers to commit errors in treatment, which can 
be significant in some cases.193 Copying and pasting certain routine 
                                                                                                                          
190 See Marianne Kolbasuk McGee, The Role of EHRs in Healthcare Fraud: Former Prosecutor 
Outlines the Potential Risks, CAREERS INFO SECURITY (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.careersinfo 
security.com/interviews/role-ehrs-in-healthcare-fraud-i-2077 (“Under the HITECH Act’s EHR 
incentive program, thousands of healthcare providers have been making the move to digitized record 
systems. Unfortunately, some of [sic] [the] automated features of EHRs can make it easier for dishonest 
providers to submit padded or fake claims to payers, Ruane says. ‘Many healthcare record systems 
contain features to expedite accurate record-keeping, but those same features can be used by fraudsters 
to help perpetuate their fraud,’ she says. For example, a healthcare provider could clone data in one 
patient record and add it to another record to support submitting claims to Medicare, Medicaid or 
private insurers for services not actually provided, says [Maureen] Ruane, who leads a new healthcare 
litigation, investigations and compliance practice . . . .”).   
191 See Justin M. Weis & Paul C. Levy, Copy, Paste, and Cloned Notes in Electronic Health 
Records: Prevalence, Benefits, Risks, and Best Practice Recommendations, 145 CHEST J. 632, 633–34 
(2014) (discussing the various benefits that come with the ability to copy and paste information in 
EHRs). 
192 See Erin McCann, CMS Called out for EHR Fraud Failings, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (Jan. 9, 
2014), http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/cms-called-out-ehr-fraud-failings (reporting that the 
Office of the Inspector General highlighted copy-and-paste functionality as a common means for 
committing fraud in EHRs). 
193 See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Masor, Electronic Medical Records and E-Discovery: With New 
Technology Come New Challenges, 5 HASTINGS  SCI. & TECH. L.J. 245, 260 (2013) (“A study also 
identified copying and pasting as a major source of electronic medical record documentation errors. 
This often occurred when medical staff would copy and paste a portion of text without properly 
proofreading it to ensure that it was still accurate. An example includes writing that a ‘patient walked 
for the first time’ repeated for three days.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (citing C.R. 
Wier et al., Direct Text Entry in Electronic Progress Notes, 42 METHODS INFO. MED. 61, 63, 67 
(2003)) (discussing the widespread use of copy-paste function by clinicians and provider employees in 
documenting medical treatment and the ensuing errors that occur)).  
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information in EHRs can be harmless, but in other instances, the practice 
can create misleading treatment records.194 One particular study found that 
nine percent of the total amount of electronic medical progress notes taken 
for patients visiting Department of Veterans Affairs facilities were 
copied.195 The same study found that of those copied notes, sixty-three 
percent were copied by human authors and not by a template-generated 
software program.196 Thus, the widespread practice of human users 
copying and pasting electronic medical progress notes—as one of the Stage 
Two meaningful use objectives explicitly encourages197—might actually be 
a cause for concern for prosecutors in light of the likelihood that most 
human users of EHR technology will copy and paste information in EHR 
progress notes. Such copying and pasting might be completely innocent as 
well, but aside from fraud concerns, the practice still creates problems for 
health care outcomes.198 Further, widespread copying and pasting by 
human health care providers can also create discovery issues in medical 
malpractice litigation and fraud prosecution, particularly when the identity 
of a transcriber is in question in a large health care facility.199   
The copy-paste function increases the potential for error in clinical 
recordkeeping and creates difficulties for litigators in detecting the source 
of entry. In early December 2013, the Office of the Inspector General 
released a report that shed light on the fraud problems that copy-paste 
technology creates in EHR technology.200 In the report, the Inspector 
                                                                                                                          
194 See Kenric W. Hammond et al., Are Electronic Medical Records Trustworthy? Observations 
on Copying, Pasting and Duplication, 2003 AMIA ANN. SYMP. PROC. 269, 269, 272. (discussing a 
study of human and template-generated copying in electronic medical progress notes for patients 
treated in U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs health care facilities between 1993 and 2002 and 
finding that of the 29,386 notes from 243 cases examined, there were 2,645 copied notes (9% of total 
notes)).  
195 Id. at 272.  
196 Id.   
197 See Stage 2 Eligible Hospital and Critical Access Hospital (CAH) Meaningful Use Core and 
Menu Objectives, supra note 62 (providing that eligible hospitals are encouraged to “record electronic 
notes in patient records” in order to achieve Stage Two meaningful use). 
198 See Anne Zieger, EMR Copy-and-Paste May Lead to Fraud, Errors, HEALTHCARE DIVE (Dec. 
10, 2013), http://www.healthcaredive.com/news/emr-copy-and-paste-may-lead-to-fraud-errors/204627/ 
(“While cutting and pasting data from one template or field to another is seldom an attempt to defraud 
anyone—it’s just a workaround to save time—it’s still a problem hospitals need to address 
systematically. Simply pushing off responsibility onto the end users doesn’t address the issue 
adequately, though. Ultimately, if clinicians are feeling so squeezed for time that they’re creating 
inaccuracies by cutting and pasting, maybe the EMR user interface is the problem.”).    
199 See Masor, supra note 193, at 261 (citing Ralph C. Losey & Kristen A. Foltz, Electronic 
Medical Records: What Are Some of the Practical Issues Lawyers Should Be Aware of During 
Discovery and Litigation?, ABA HEALTH ESOURCE (June 2009), http://www.americanbar.org/content 
/newsletter/publications/aba_health_esource_home/Losey.html) (pointing out the legal conundrums 
that copy-paste practices with EHRs create for litigators trying to identify a tortfeasor in medical 
malpractice cases).  
200  See generally OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T HEALTH HUMAN SERVS., OEI-01-11-00570, 
NOT ALL RECOMMENDED FRAUD SAFEGUARDS HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED IN HOSPITAL EHR 
TECHNOLOGY (Dec. 2013) [hereinafter OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN.] (presenting the findings of a study 
that involved interviewing over eight hundred hospitals that received Medicare incentive payments to 
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General indicated that it had contracted with RTI International,201 a health 
information technology research institute, to make recommendations 
regarding protection of EHRs against fraud in connection with the 
report.202 The Inspector General surveyed 864 hospitals and found that 
“only about one quarter of hospitals had policies regarding the use of the 
copy-paste feature in EHR technology, which, if used improperly, could 
pose a fraud vulnerability.”203 The report further indicated that of the 
hospitals that had audit log technology, only forty-four percent “recorded 
the method of data entry (e.g., copy-paste, direct text entry, speech 
recognition) when data [were] entered into the EHR.”204 Sixty-one percent 
of the hospitals placed the burden of ensuring accuracy of the copied and 
pasted information on the providers using the EHR.205 Fifty-one percent of 
the hospitals also reported that they were unable to disable, restrict, or 
customize copy-paste functions, which several EHR vendors also 
confirmed in the survey.206 
As the Inspector General’s report suggests, copy-paste features place 
an enormous amount of confidence in the human EHR user to record 
accurate information. This confidence can be particularly problematic 
when such a user is prone to human error or intent on defrauding patients 
or the government. According to the Inspector General’s report, the 
Research Triangle Institute recommended that hospitals and government 
investigators use audit logs to detect misuse of the copy-paste feature of 
EHR technology.207 Audit log technology is one method of detecting fraud 
in copied and pasted EHR notes, but as the report also indicated, not all 
audit logs can determine the method of data entry, which is essential for 
determining if information was copied and pasted.208 
From a health care fraud perspective, a prosecutor still has to prove 
that a defendant “knowingly and willfully executed . . . a scheme or artifice 
                                                                                                                          
use certified EHR technology and concluding that many hospitals had not been adequately employing 
anti-fraud measures such as audit logs to address fraud vulnerabilities that may be facilitated by EHR 
features such as copy-paste functionality).  
201 See Health IT and Electronic Health Information Exchange, RTI INT’L,  http://www.rti.org/ 
page.cfm/Health_Information_Technology (last visited Feb. 1, 2015) (indicating that its clients include 
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services).  
202 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 200, at i. 
203 Id.  
204 Id. at 14.  
205 Id. 
206 Id.; see Robert Lowes, Fraud-Wary Feds to Regulate EHR Copy-and-Paste Function, 
MEDSCAPE (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/817604 (“The OIG report suggests 
that many hospitals may have a hard time controlling the use of copy-and-paste. Roughly half of the 
hospitals surveyed said that they are unable to disable, restrict, or otherwise customize the copy-and-
paste function of their EHR systems.”).  
207 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 200, at 14.  
208 See id. at 9 (“[H]ospital audit logs are less likely to record the method of data entry (e.g., direct 
text entry, speech recognition, automated) or the original date, time, and user identification when data 
are copy-pasted.”). 
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to defraud.”209 Prosecutors and federal investigators presumably had more 
clues to detect the requisite knowledge or scheme to defraud in 
handwritten medical progress notes, seeing as they could have identified a 
particular transcriber’s handwriting or commonly used phraseology.210 
Provided that EHR technology does not identify the transcriber, copy-paste 
technology increasingly will deprive prosecutors of these clues in the 
HITECH Act era: it will allow transcribers to use another transcriber’s 
phraseology and it will record the borrowed language in standardized 
handwriting. Not only will prosecutors be unable to identify a transcriber 
by handwriting, but they also will likely not be certain that the recorder is 
the actual person indicated in the EHR.211 The aforementioned Veteran 
Affairs study authors noted the particular difficulty in detecting human 
copying edits in EHRs without the assistance of detection software.212 
Copy-paste technology not only might create obstacles for identifying 
the transcriber, but it also may mislead prosecutors into proving that a 
provider is willfully executing a scheme to defraud when they are actually 
using the feature carelessly. For example, a transcriber examining a patient 
over a course of many years may copy and paste information from the 
patient’s first visit into every subsequent recording in the EHR.213 Thus, 
while symptoms observed on the first appointment may have been no 
longer present after a certain amount of visits, they still appear in the 
recorded notes for all of the patient’s visits.214 This phenomenon can be 
particularly problematic when EHR progress notes continue across 
                                                                                                                          
209 Podgor, supra note 183 (emphasis added).  
210 See generally Moon & Matsiga, supra note 189 (presenting examples of fraud in medical 
notes). 
211 This proposition relies on the presumption that the EHR technology indicates the identity of 
the transcriber. Even then, a prosecutor cannot be certain that a previous user had not logged out and 
another person recorded the notes under their name. This is one way in which electronic progress notes 
might actually be counterproductive as opposed to paper notes. Of course, it may be the case that EHR 
technology might eventually permit clinicians to record handwritten notes in electronic format, but this 
does not yet seem to be a pervasive feature in EHRs.   
212 See Hammond et al., supra note 194, at 272–73 (“Unlike machine copy-artifact, human 
copying is hard to detect without technical aid. . . . The variety, creativity and subtlety of human 
copying efforts were broad. Without Copyfind-VA it would have been very difficult to distinguish 
valid from invalid records. With it, many innocent-appearing records raised doubts.”).  
213 See Appropriate Use of the Copy and Paste Functionality in Electronic Health Records, AM. 
HEALTH INFO. MGMT. ASS’N 4 (Mar. 17, 2014), http://library.ahima.org/xpedio/groups/public/doc 
uments/ahima/bok1_050621.pdf (“However, a number of challenges and risks associated with the 
copy/paste function have been identified. These include: Inaccurate or outdated information; Redundant 
information, which makes it difficult to identify the current information . . . .”); see also Robert E. 
Hirschtick, Copy-and-Paste, 295 JAMA 2335, 2335 (2006) (“Daily progress notes become 
progressively longer and contain senescent information. The admitting diagnostic impression, long 
since discarded, is dutifully noted day after day. Last month’s echocardiogram report takes up 
permanent residence in the daily results section. Complicated patients are on ‘post-op day 2’ for weeks. 
One wonders how utilization review interprets such statements.”).  
214 See Hirschtick, supra note 213 (noting how copy-paste functionality can exacerbate the 
accumulation of erroneous information in patient progress notes). 
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separate hospital admissions because it misleads other providers.215 A 
different provider working off of a previous provider’s inaccurate progress 
notes will then bill Medicare—or the patient herself—for procedures that 
were not medically necessary, which can be proven as fraud.216 A 
prosecutor might be misled into thinking that the provider is willfully 
executing a scheme to defraud when, in fact, he was just basing treatment 
on inaccurate notes that an earlier provider recorded in an EHR. Of course, 
the meaningful use objective mandating that patients have more control 
over their own records might eliminate this problem,217 but they are not 
immune from misinterpretation either. The Department of Justice and the 
Inspector General have already expressed a strong intent to punish fraud 
enabled by copy-paste technology in EHRs,218 but its capabilities have 
enabled some fraudulent health care providers to circumvent the law. 
2.  Auto-Population Functions  
Another functional characteristic of EHR technology that presents 
obstacles for fraud detection and that enables perpetrators to commit fraud 
is the auto-fill, or auto-population feature. Similar to the copy-paste feature 
in many EHR software programs, auto-population features aim to make 
medical documentation quicker and effortless, yet they easily propagate 
inaccurate and fraudulent information. Auto-population technology 
automatically inputs data into an EHR when a user clicks an option on a 
drop-down menu, checks off a box, or types a template response into a 
data-entry field.219 If the user is short on time, he may simply check off one 
                                                                                                                          
215 See id. (“EMR also allows the copy-and-paste function to be used across hospital admissions, 
so that the last note from the previous admission can be used, with additions, as the first note for a 
readmission. Moreover, EMR encourages everyone to copy-and-paste the notes of everyone else so that 
notes become the same from author to author as well as from day to day. Even consultants are 
assimilated into the oneness of the EMR Borg. A cardiology consultant recently copied-and-pasted the 
intern’s note into his own, even including ‘consult cardiology in AM’ in his recommendations. Perhaps 
he meant consult a more thoughtful cardiologist.”).   
216 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a)(1)(E) (2012) (providing, inter alia, that a provider who files 
reimbursement claims to the federal government for health care procedures that the provider “knows or 
should know are not medically necessary” is liable for civil penalties).  
217 See Peabody, Jr., supra note 57, at 200 (providing that Stage 2 requirements aim to give 
patients more control over their own EHRs).   
218 See Robert Radick, EMRs: The New Health Care Fraud Frontier?, FORBES (Dec. 4, 2012, 
4:58 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2012/12/04/emrs-the-new-health-care-fraud-frontier/ 
(“Attorney General Holder and Secretary Sebelius bluntly warned in their letter that ‘[l]aw enforcement 
will take appropriate steps to pursue health care providers who misuse electronic health records to bill 
for services never provided.’”) (quoting Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Atty. Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., 
& Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Richard Umbdenstock, President 
& CEO, Am. Hosp. Ass’n, Charles N. Kahn, III, President & CEO, Fed’n of Am. Hosps., Steve 
Wartman, President & CEO, Ass’n of Academic Health Ctrs., Darrell G. Kirch, President & CEO, 
Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls., & Bruce Siegel, President & CEO, Nat’l Ass’n of Pub. Hosps. & Health 
Sys. (Sept. 24, 2012) (on file with author), available at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012 
/09/25/business/25medicare-doc.html). 
219 See Donald A. Wochna, Electronic Medical Records: Ready or Not, Here They Come!, OHIO 
STATE BAR ASS’N (Apr. 8, 2013), https://www.ohiobar.org/ForPublic/Resources/LawYouCan 
 
 2015] READING BETWEEN THE LINES OF ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS 1141 
box, allow data to auto-populate in other fields, and move onto another 
task.220 This common practice leads to over-documentation, which “is the 
practice of inserting false or irrelevant documentation to create the 
appearance of support for billing higher level services.”221 Another 
instance of over-documentation might occur if there are template responses 
in an EHR input interface that do not entirely encapsulate a patient’s 
condition. Instead of taking time to note all of a patient’s complaints or 
symptoms, a careless physician or employee may simply type in a template 
response for one data field that auto-populates other unnecessary fields, 
which leads to over-billing.222 Not only do such practices produce errors in 
treatment and shelter fraud, but they also damage the integrity of diagnosis 
techniques.223 While these common practices may be innocuous—just like 
copy-paste features—they can disguise intentional fraud.   
Auto-population-induced over-documentation224 usually manifests 
                                                                                                                          
Use/Pages/Electronic-Medical-Records-Ready-or-Not-Here-They-Come.aspx (answering basic 
questions about EHR technology and pertinent legal issues); see also David B. Troxel, Electronic 
Health Record Malpractice Risks, DOCTORS CO., http://www.thedoctors.com/KnowledgeCenter 
/PatientSafety/articles/CON_ID_003743 (last visited Mar. 9, 2015) (“Computer-assisted documentation 
[for EHRs] uses point-and-click lists, drop-down menus, auto-fill, templates, and canned text to bypass 
natural language and produce structured progress notes.”).  
220 See generally AHIMA, Integrity of the Healthcare Record: Best Practices for EHR 
Documentation, 84 J. AHIMA 58, 58–60 (2013), available at http://library.ahima.org/xpedio/groups 
/public/documents/ahima/bok1_050286.hcsp?dDocName=bok1_050286 [hereinafter Integrity of the 
Healthcare Record] (assessing how auto-population features in EHR technology can damage the 
integrity of documentation).  
221 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OEI-01-11-00571, 
CMS AND ITS CONTRACTORS HAVE ADOPTED FEW PROGRAM INTEGRITY PRACTICES TO ADDRESS 
VULNERABILITIES IN EHRS 2 (2014) [hereinafter CMS AND ITS CONTRACTORS]. 
222 See, e.g., Dawn Landry, Audit Issues with Templated Documentation, GILL COMPLIANCE 
SOLUTIONS BLOG (Oct. 28, 2013), http://gillcompliance.com/blog/comments/audit-issues-with-
templated-documentation (“An EMR system may allow a provider to ‘point and click’ through bullet 
points on a template unknowingly navigating to a higher level of service. For example, clicking through 
[sic] a template to obtain a comprehensive history and exam for an established patient who is 
presenting for a straightforward problem, such as an insect bite with no other complaints . . . .”).  
223 See, e.g., Pat Janakowski, Electronic Medical Records: Friend or Foe?, LABOR NOTES (July 
16, 2013), http://www.labornotes.org/2013/07/electronic-medical-records-friend-or-foe (noting that 
nursing is “[n]ot an [e]xact [s]cience” and stating that “[w]e [nurses] didn’t go into nursing in order to 
fill in contextual menus to comply with reimbursement requirements”); see also Laura Roberts, Partner, 
HC Healthcare Consulting, & Amy Bailey-Muckler, Dir. of Compliance at Catholic Health East, 
Address at the Connecticut Hospital Association’s 2013 Corporate Compliance Conference: Electronic 
Health Records—Auditing Quality and Compliance (Apr. 2, 2013), available at http://www.health 
lawyers.org/events/programs/materials/documents/fc12/205_muckler_roberts_slides.pdf (“The 
computer may become a barrier between the doctor and the patient. When the doctor fills in a computer 
template, it may divert attention from the patient, limit interactive conversation, and restrict creative 
thinking.”).  
224 This phenomenon is referred to as “upcoding,” which is defined as “[a] fraudulent practice in 
which provider services are billed for higher CPT procedure codes than were actually performed, 
resulting in a higher payment by Medicare or 3rd-party payors.” Medical Dictionary: Upcoding, FREE 
DICTIONARY, http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/upcoding (last visited Mar. 9, 2015). 
CPT codes are codes assigned to different medical procedures that can be billed to Medicare. “CPT” 
stands for Current Procedural Terminology. Trisha Torrey, What Are CPT Codes?, ABOUT.COM, 
http://patients.about.com/od/costsconsumerism/a/cptcodes.htm (last updated Nov. 25, 2014).  
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itself in the billing and insurance contexts. For example, if a patient is 
required to fill in a bubble sheet for a review of her systems, indicating a 
current level of pain on a number scale from one to ten but there is no 
option for “no complaints,” the patient might simply not fill in any of the 
corresponding bubbles. 225 If that sheet also has a box for indicating that 
there are no complaints and the patient fails to fill it out, a hurried 
technician may scan the sheet into EHR format, which automatically 
generates corresponding entries of “negative for pain” in the pain scale, 
suggesting that the patient was examined.226 Based on this information, the 
provider subsequently might bill Medicare for procedures that it did not 
actually perform. Further, this excessive information will continue in the 
chain of treatment, particularly in the interoperable EHR network that the 
HITECH Act strives to achieve.227 Auto-population technology also 
permits fraud perpetrators to set an abnormally high default reimbursement 
rate for all visits and to rely on hurried administrative employees to 
downcode the level if the patient’s visit requires.228 In the busy practice of 
health care, it is not hard to imagine that administrative employees forget 
to do this, causing Medicare to be billed at an abnormally high rate. These 
phenomena could be pure products of carelessness. On the other hand, they 
present loopholes for fraudsters to exploit. Ultimately, upcoding Medicare 
claims constitutes fraud within the ambit of the False Claims Act,229 and 
prosecutors might not be able to tell the difference between pure 
negligence and a scheme to defraud. 
While over-documentation fraud has been easier to detect than its 
                                                                                                                          
225 See, e.g., Cheryl L. Toth, Auto-Population Gone Wild: EMR Documentation Can Create Risky 
Record Keeping, AM. ACAD. PROF. CODERS (Feb. 17, 2010), http://news.aapc.com/index.php/2010 
/02/auto-population-gone-wild/ (portraying a similar bubble sheet auto-fill example). 
226 Id.; see Integrity of the Healthcare Record, supra note 220 (“For example, the automatic 
generation of common negative findings within a review of systems for each body area or organ system 
may result in a higher level of service delivered, unless the provider documents any pertinent positive 
results and deletes the incorrect auto-generated entries.”). 
227 See How Does the HITECH Act Address Barriers to Information Exchange?, HEALTHIT.GOV, 
http://www.healthit.gov/policy-researchers-implementers/faqs/how-does-hitech-act-address-barriers-
information-exchange (last updated Jan. 15, 2013) (“The HITECH Act focuses on ‘interoperability,’ 
meaning that policies, programs, and incentives must aim for EHR software and systems that can share 
information with other EHR software and systems.”). “An interoperable EHR is one that permits the 
exchange of patient health information among disparate clinicians and other authorized entities in real 
time and under stringent security, privacy, and other protections.” WILLIAM H. ROACH, JR. ET AL., 
MEDICAL RECORDS AND THE LAW 448 (4th ed. 2006).  
228 See, e.g., Julie Malida, Health Insurance Fraud Gets Easier; So Should Stopping It, INS. 
NETWORKING NEWS, Sept.–Oct. 2011, at 33 (providing a similar example).  
229 See United States ex rel. Harris v. Bernad, 275 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3–5 (D.D.C. 2003) (denying the 
defendant physicians’ motion to dismiss the Government’s qui tam action alleging that they upcoded 
claims to Medicare in violation of the False Claims Act); see also Preventing Fraud in Your Electronic 
Medical Records, SUNERA HEALTHCARE (Jan. 2, 2014), https://healthcare.sunera.com/blog/preventing-
fraud-electronic-medical-record-emr/ (“Over-documentation leads to upcoding, and submitting an 
upcoded claim is a fraud.”).   
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copy-and-paste counterpart,230 prosecutors still shoulder the same essential 
burden of proving an intentional and knowing “scheme or artifice to 
defraud” to successfully convict a perpetrator of health care fraud.231 The 
auto-population feature of EHRs is also problematic for detecting fraud 
because not only can fraudster providers hide behind the mask of 
electronic documentation, but they can also cover up their tracks. Jennifer 
Trussell, special advisor to the Inspector General, stressed the difficulty of 
tracking EHR technology with auto-population features—especially 
without audit-trailing software—when she noted that investigators of 
electronic health care fraud “don’t know whether the doctor checked or 
unchecked, whether it was the biller, the receptionist or some guy on the 
street.”232 If audit logs cannot detect when a perpetrator made fraudulent 
alterations in an EHR record, fraudsters have a green light to cover up a 
scheme or artifice to defraud by simply unchecking numerous boxes and 
saving the records in a patient’s EHR.233 In a practice using paper medical 
records, if suspect providers subsequently correct errors to cover up 
fraudulent information, they typically cross out information and make 
corrections.234 In a practice using EHRs that have template and auto-
population functionality, a provider with aims to defraud can make 
encrypted changes, which are much more complex to detect.235 
 
 
   
                                                                                                                          
230 See, e.g., Kyle Murphy, OIG Report Shows Flaws in CMS Detection of EHR-Related Fraud, 
EHR INTELLIGENCE (Jan. 9, 2014), http://ehrintelligence.com/2014/01/09/oig-report-shows-flaws-in-
cms-detection-of-ehr-related-fraud/ (“On the subject of the two most common forms of EHR-related 
fraud, overdocumentation and copy-paste language, the CMS contractors display various degrees of 
competency for identifying either practice. Although overdocumentation in EHRs was more easily 
detected . . . copied language in these records eluded half of all the contractors surveyed.”). 
231 18 U.S.C. § 1347(a) (2012); see Podgor, supra note 183 (noting that although the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 relaxed the mens rea requirement for the federal health 
care fraud offense, prosecutors still must prove a scheme or artifice to defraud in order to convict a 
defendant). 
232 See Alicia Caramenico, Healthcare Fraud Alert: 7 Trends to Watch, FIERCEHEALTHPAYER 
(Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.fiercehealthpayer.com/story/healthcare-fraud-alert-7-trends-watch/2013-
11-20 (“The increasing adoption of electronic health records has led healthcare into an era of ‘perfectly 
documented fraud,’ according to Trussell. Many EHR systems, for example, allow autopopulation to 
automatically check what the clinician did to make the diagnosis and uncheck what he or she didn’t 
do.” (quoting Jennifer Trussell)). 
233 Id.   
234 See Losey & Foltz, supra note 199 (discussing EHR error correction implications for 
discovery purposes). 
235 See Oracle White Paper: HITECH’s Challenge to the Health Care Industry, ORACLE 7–9, 14–
15 (Oct. 2011), http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/database/security/owp-security-hipaa-hitech-
522515.pdf  (discussing the specialized area of data encryption in EHRs and noting that even though 
encryption is essential for protecting the security of protected health information, it can also contribute 
to the complexities involved in maintaining the integrity of EHRs).  
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3.  Cyber Portability  
One common characteristic of EHRs that raises fraud concerns is their 
portability across cyber media, particularly in nationwide information 
networks.236 The HITECH Act guards against some of these fraud concerns 
with components such as the data breach rule and protected health 
information security regulations. However, prosecutors should be wary of 
the fraud implications that the proliferation of EHRs in a nationwide 
network have, particularly with respect to medical identity theft. While 
medical identity theft may not be unique to EHRs, the proliferation of 
EHRs certainly may change its habitat. 
The Health Care Fraud Prevention and Enforcement Action Team 
provides recommendations on how to spot health care fraud and devotes 
significant attention to medical identity theft.237 The increased nationwide 
use of EHRs propelled protected health information security concerns to 
the forefront of policy debate. Medical identity theft is a key element 
driving these concerns.238 The Attorney General of California, Kamala D. 
Harris, defines medical identity theft as “the fraudulent use of an 
individual’s identifying information in a health care setting to obtain 
medical services or goods, or for financial gain.”239 Attorney General 
Harris also notes that medical identity theft occurs in numerous ways, but 
one common way is insider abuse of access to patient EHRs.240 This occurs 
when employees, nurses, and physicians with unlawful motives use 
patients’ protected health information to obtain insurance proceeds or bill 
for higher services.241 The effects of this crime can be particularly 
devastating because they can create fictitious information that follows the 
actual patient and can harm them long after the theft occurs.242   
According to a 2013 survey, the Medical Identity Fraud Alliance 
discovered that medical identity theft affects a large segment of the U.S. 
                                                                                                                          
236 See David Schultz, As Patients’ Records Go Digital, Theft and Hacking Problems Grow, 
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (June 3, 2012), http://kaiserhealthnews.org/news/electronic-health-records-
theft-hacking/ (claiming that the proliferation of EHRs increases the risk of medical data breaches, 
which “can lead to everything from identity theft to billing fraud to blackmail”).  
237 See Common Scams and Identity Theft, STOPMEDICAREFRAUD.GOV, http://www.stopmedicare 
fraud.gov/preventfraud/scams-identity-theft/index.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2015) (explaining 
common forms of health care fraud).   
238 See Kamala D. Harris, Medical Identity Theft: Recommendations for the Age of Electronic 
Medical Records, CAL. DEP’T. JUST. i (Oct. 2013) (noting that the “escalation” EHRs has made medical 
identity theft a crucial area of concern with respect to care quality).  
239 Id. at 1.   
240 Id.  
241 Id.  
242 See Medical Identity Theft, WORLD PRIVACY F., http://www.worldprivacyforum.org 
/category/med-id-theft/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2015) (“[Medical identity theft] is also the most difficult 
[identity theft crime] to fix after the fact, because victims have limited rights and recourses. Medical 
identity theft typically leaves a trail of falsified information in medical records that can plague victims’ 
medical and financial lives for years.”).    
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population.243 The survey involved nearly eight hundred adults who self-
reported that they or a family member were victims of medical identity 
theft.244 Further, the survey’s researchers found that while there were 
approximately 313,000 medical identity theft victims reported in 2012, 
they estimated that there were 1.84 million victims in 2013.245 The 
Alliance projected out-of-pocket cost to these 1.84 million victims to be 
twelve billion dollars.246 Over fifty percent of the adults surveyed indicated 
that they suffered financially from the theft, which came in the form of 
required reimbursements to providers who paid identity thieves, lapsed 
insurance coverage, and increased insurance premiums.247 The survey’s 
findings regarding some of the causes of the theft shed some light on how 
EHRs may increase vulnerability. The survey posited some of the 
following occurrences as the most likely causes of medical identity theft: a 
family member took the victim’s personal medical credentials without 
consent (28%); a health care provider used the victim’s ID to conduct 
fraudulent billing (22%); personal information was inadvertently provided 
to a scam e-mail or website (8%); a health care provider, insurer, or other 
related organization had a data breach (7%); and an employee working in 
the health care provider’s office stole the victim’s health information 
(5%).248 Further, 14% of the participants reported that they did not know 
the cause of their breach.249 
These results are startling in light of the massive proliferation of EHRs 
encouraged by the HITECH Act. One attractive feature of EHR technology 
is its cyber portability, its ability to be viewable at the stroke of a key or a 
click of the mouse.250 A large majority of medical identity theft reported in 
the Medical Identity Fraud Alliance survey arose from instances where this 
same portability is a factor, such as instances involving a data breach, a 
provider that fraudulently bills, a fraudulent website or e-mail address, and 
an employee who steals.251 EHRs might actually reduce a victim’s 
vulnerability to theft in situations where family members stole medical 
credentials, but one of the meaningful use objectives for Stage Two is to 
                                                                                                                          
243 Medical ID Theft Rates, Costs Continue to Climb as Consumers Fail to Protect Their Info or 
to Report Crime—Report, PHIPRIVACY.NET (Sept. 12, 2013, 7:11 AM), http://www.phiprivacy.net/ 
medical-id-theft-rates-costs-continue-to-climb-as-consumers-fail-to-protect-their-info-or-to-report-
crime-report/ [hereinafter Medical ID Theft Rates].   
244 Id.   
245 Id.   
246 Id.  
247 Id.  
248 Id.   
249 Id.  
250 See ROACH, JR. ET AL., supra note 227, at 446 (defining a component of an EHR system as 
“[i]mmediate electronic access to person- and population-level information by authorized users”).   
251 See Medical ID Theft Rates, supra note 243, at fig.13 (positing the most likely causes of 
medical identity theft). 
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give patients more access to, and control over, their own records.252 This 
raises the question: what is stopping family members from having access 
to these EHRs? Further, while employees with fraudulent aims might have 
been unable to steal large folders filled with patient X-rays, they might 
have much less difficulty stealing a thumb drive or burning protected 
health information onto a compact disc. Lastly, in light of some of the 
massive data breaches reported pursuant to the HITECH Act’s data breach 
rule,253 the data breach causes of medical identity theft are also troubling. 
Thus, the cyber portability of EHRs may expose protected health 
information to medical identity theft in new ways that prosecutors must 
recognize. The HITECH Act’s data breach rule is an important tool for 
prosecutors to understand how data breaches occur,254 but this only sheds 
light on one limb of the multi-limbed beast that is medical identity theft. 
Ultimately, prosecutors must be able to follow stolen protected health 
information to its end destination where end-users use it to perpetrate 
fraud.   
IV.  PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Given that the widespread use of EHRs is currently in progress, the 
federal government has already begun to address some of the 
aforementioned issues related to fraud in EHRs. Nevertheless, detecting 
and prosecuting fraud in the world of EHRs is still in its infancy, and a 
flexible yet responsive plan is necessary to rein in health care fraud in its 
various forms.  
A.  Establish Guidelines and Promote Technology Education 
One of the main concerns raised in the Office of the Inspector 
General’s January 2014 report was the lack of guidance that the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services had provided to Medicare contractors on 
how to implement policies for detecting fraud in EHRs.255 As the Office of 
the Inspector General’s report suggests, the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services should increase efforts in providing guidelines for 
detecting fraudulent information in EHRs.256 Moreover, guidelines should 
                                                                                                                          
252 See Peabody, Jr., supra note 57, at 200 (providing that one of the Stage Two criteria focuses on 
more patient-controlled data and one of the Stage Three criteria focuses on increasing patient access to 
self-management tools for their EHRs).  
253 See supra notes 143–58 and accompanying text (reporting data breaches affecting more than 
five hundred persons).   
254 42 U.S.C. § 17932 (2012). 
255 See CMS AND ITS CONTRACTORS, supra note 221, at 9 (noting that the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services have not adequately communicated with contractors about detecting fraud in 
EHR-based claims).  
256 See id. at 8 tbl.3 (reporting that, inter alia, only one of the eight participating Medicare 
Administrative Contractors, one of four participating Recovery Audit Contractors, and none of the six 
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explain the variety of features that EHR software provides and how these 
features can help to perpetrate fraud. Attorneys, patients, health care 
providers, and their business associates should proactively educate 
themselves about EHR functional features and the ways in which such 
features can mask fraudulent billing or clinical practices. If patients, 
providers, and prosecutors become shrewder with EHR technology, they 
will be more adept in recognizing fraud and stopping it via qui tam actions, 
criminal prosecution, or internal audit proceedings.257 The standardization 
of EHR formats will facilitate creating guidelines for fraud detection, but 
central authorities like the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
should always stay abreast of new technologies that develop in the world 
of health information. These central authorities should also share their 
knowledge with all anti-fraud entities with which they cooperate. 
B.  Strengthen Coordinated Enforcement Approaches 
In addition to learning about the functional characteristics of EHRs, 
anti-fraud authorities should coordinate their efforts with numerous parties 
to enhance their fraud detection strategies. These anti-fraud authorities 
should also embrace the power of data-analysis technology in their 
detection efforts. In this vein, the federal government has already made 
some progress, as evidenced by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services’ Fraud Prevention System258 and the Health Care Fraud 
Prevention and Enforcement Action Team. Investigators who seek to 
detect fraud should work together in these kinds of multipronged 
enforcement organizations because they are most effective in detecting and 
stopping fraud in its evolving forms.  
Programs like the Fraud Prevention System that use predictive 
                                                                                                                          
participating Zone Program Integrity Contractors received guidance from the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services on over-documentation in EHRs).  
257 See Lisa A. Eramo, Stopping Fraud: Detecting and Preventing Fraud in the e-Health Era, 82 
J. AHIMA 28, 30 (2011) (suggesting that health care providers and patients should become more 
educated on how to detect fraud in EHRs). In this vein, Congress has already enacted legislation that 
calls upon the Department of Health and Human Services to conduct a nationwide education initiative 
with respect to the security and privacy of protected health information, 42 U.S.C. § 17933 (2012), but 
this Note urges that such initiatives should also focus on EHR fraud detection and prevention. 
258 See Fraud Prevention Toolkit: CMS Fraud Prevention Initiative, CMS.GOV, http://www.cms. 
gov/Outreach-and-Education/Outreach/Partnerships/FraudPreventionToolkit.html (last updated July 29, 
2013, 10:43 AM) (“CMS is also using a predictive analytic technology called the Fraud Prevention 
System to identify the highest risk claims for fraud, waste and abuse in real time that has stopped, 
prevented or identified $115 million in payments, resulting in an estimated $3 for every $1 spent in its 
very first year.”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7m(b) (2012) (requiring the HHS Secretary to use 
“predictive analytics technologies [that] shall—(1) capture Medicare provider and Medicare 
beneficiary activities . . . in order to—(A) identify and analyze Medicare provider networks, provider 
billing patterns, and beneficiary utilization patterns; and (B) identify and detect any such patterns and 
networks that represent a high risk of fraudulent activity”). 
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analytics to uncover fraud259 are crucial in the age of EHR technology. The 
government’s adoption of fraud detection via informatics represents a step 
in the right direction because law enforcement officials will ultimately be 
better able to pierce the veil that EHRs create for fraud that was once 
blatant on paper. Law enforcement authorities should also develop, 
enhance, and use audit logs, which can accurately determine who accessed 
an EHR and when changes were made to it.260 Furthermore, lawmakers and 
law enforcement authorities should incentivize EHR software vendors to 
implement anti-fraud technology into their products. Specifically, 
authorities could require vendors to make the baseline settings of their 
EHR software include user-identification features that require every user to 
enter clear identity information every time he or she accesses an EHR.261 
While such measures may require fraud investigators to become better 
versed in predictive health informatics—which is arguably a more cryptic 
means of detecting health care fraud—prosecutors and law enforcement 
officials eventually can learn to understand it and begin to notice trends, 
outliers, and red flags. It is also important to note, however, that anti-fraud 
authorities must be on the same page with each other, considering how 
complicated and interconnected the world of health information is at this 
point in time. Further, given that private citizens can bring qui tam actions 
against suspected perpetrators of fraud, the reliability of information 
provided to investigators and prosecutors should always be evaluated. This 
is why collaborative efforts involving multiple entities would be most 
useful in uncovering and punishing fraud.  
On the prosecution-side of coordinated enforcement efforts, 
prosecutors must tailor their presentation of evidence, their experts, and 
their legal arguments to present a willful and knowing execution of a 
fraudulent scheme or artifice to defraud. Perhaps this is the greatest 
                                                                                                                          
259 The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ predictive analytics basically evaluate 
Medicare claims in real time and compute a risk score based upon various metrics like type of provider, 
type of service, identity of beneficiary, and patterns in claims. The Centers will then investigate 
potential fraud based upon that risk score. Linda Rosencrance, How Predictive Analytics Help Fight 
Healthcare Fraud, TIBCOSPOTFIRE (Nov. 1, 2011), http://spotfire.tibco.com/blog/?p=8738.   
260 See Masor, supra note 193, at 254 (discussing the utility of audit trails in determining EHR 
authenticity).   
261 Cf. AHIMA, Privacy and Security Audits of Electronic Health Information, 88 J. AHIMA 54, 
54 (2014) (“In a perfect world, access controls alone would ensure the privacy and security of 
electronic protected health information (ePHI). However, the complexities of today’s healthcare 
environment make it extremely challenging to limit access to the minimum information necessary that 
members of the workforce require in order to perform their jobs. In smaller organizations and 
community-based hospitals, employees may perform multiple functions, each of which requires 
different levels of access. Without having access to specific portions of every patient’s health record, 
employees’ effectiveness could be significantly inhibited, and patient care and safety could be 
compromised. Organizations must develop security audits and related policies and procedures to hold 
members of the workforce accountable for their actions when accessing ePHI through the electronic 
health record (EHR).”). 
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challenge of all, but it might be more feasible as legal precedents emerge 
and as prosecutors become more adept at recognizing fraud in EHR 
format.262 Prosecutors must get creative in presenting circumstantial 
evidence as well.263 For example, prosecutors must be able to take a step 
back from the particularized data contained in EHRs and the corresponding 
billing documents.264 Instead, prosecutors should present evidence 
concerning how a suspected fraud perpetrator’s EHRs compare to those of 
other providers in the industry or in the same geographic area. In this light, 
prosecutors should be able to transcend the seemingly legitimate 
appearance that fraudulent records may have in electronic format. 
Policymakers should also work in tandem with law enforcement 
officials and prosecutors and should be mindful of how legislative 
initiatives like the HITECH Act’s EHR incentive and meaningful use 
programs may perpetuate fraud. In light of United States Senator Orrin 
Hatch’s statement at the Committee on Finance’s July 2013 hearing on 
health information technology, legislators should not be afraid to “push the 
pause button” on legislative initiatives incentivizing overtly beneficial 
technology.265 While stopping the meaningful use program is not 
advisable, legislators should take Senator Hatch’s sentiment to heart and 
look at the big picture surrounding legislative goals. In short, lawmakers 
                                                                                                                          
262 Prosecutors should also rely more heavily on billing or treatment standards in a provider’s 
particular health care industry to present evidence of abnormal practices suggesting a scheme to 
defraud. For a useful example of how a prosecutor proved a physician’s scheme to defraud based upon 
medical necessity standards in the physician’s industry, see United States v. Patel, 485 F. App’x 702 
(5th Cir. 2012).    
263 See id. at 708 (“Intent to defraud is typically proven with circumstantial evidence and 
inferences.” (citing United States v. Ismoila, 100 F.3d 380, 387 (5th Cir. 1996)). For an example of a 
prosecutor’s successful presentation of circumstantial evidence to prove that a defendant knowingly 
participated in a scheme to defraud Medicaid, see United States v. Essien, 530 F. App’x 291, 299–300 
(5th Cir. 2013).    
264 See, e.g., BUSCH, supra note 181, at 273–74 (“An electronic interoperable healthcare market 
opens the doors to tremendous opportunities in the area of waste, fraud, and abuse. . . . The market does 
not move forward with respect to standards, for example, simple analyses of how many patients are 
being treated for a particular diagnosis. The universal billing form created this opportunity by forcing 
the market to submit the content of the bill in a consistent format among all providers. The 
standardization of the universal billing form along with sophisticated computer tools, has allowed for 
exploratory data analysis (EDA) opportunities of large volumes of data for waste, fraud, and abuse 
through comparative analysis from provider to provider and market to market.”).  
265 See Health Information Technology: A Building Block to Quality Health Care: Hearing Before 
the S. Committee on Finance, 113th Cong. 6 (2013) (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch) (“It would seem 
to me that we have an opportunity to push the ‘pause’ button and make sure that the [meaningful use] 
program is working before we continue down a potentially unsustainable path.”); Press Release, Senate 
Comm. on Fin., Hatch Statement at Finance Committee Hearing Examining How Health Information 
Technology Can Improve Health Care Quality (July 17, 2013), available at http://www.finance.senate. 
gov/imo/media/doc/07%2017%2013%20Hatch%20Opening%20Statement%20on%20Health%20IT%2
0hearing.pdf (same); see also Dan Bowman, Hatch Wants to Pause, Reassess Meaningful Use, 
FIERCEEMR (July 18, 2013), http://www.fierceemr.com/story/hatch-wants-pause-reassess-meaningful-
use/2013-07-18 (reporting Senator Hatch’s comments at the Senate Finance Committee hearing,which 
expressed his concern as to whether the meaningful use program was actually saving the government 
money). 
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should never hesitate to view every legislative act related to EHRs as a 
double-edged sword: more widespread use of EHRs could create more 
exposure to potential medical identity theft via cyberspace; more patient 
access to EHRs could lessen physicians’ ability to treat the patient; more 
automated data entry features could conceal fraud from prosecutors. 
Legislators should address all of these considerations with equal analytical 
vigor. Further, state legislators should not assume that Congress ultimately 
dictates policy related to EHR fraud. Instead, they should take the initiative 
to enact state laws to account for federal law deficiencies. For example, 
one section in the Code of Federal Regulations provides that federal 
provisions preempt contrary state provisions, except for state provisions 
that are “necessary . . . [t]o prevent fraud and abuse related to the provision 
of or payment for health care.”266 In essence, this statutory exception grants 
state legislators permission to experiment with legislation that addresses a 
nationwide policy concern. 
Finally, patients should be privy to their health care providers’ actions 
as they relate to their EHRs. HIPAA and the HITECH Act pave the way 
for more patient access to EHRs through the meaningful use program and 
patients should always be wary of inconsistencies or abnormalities in their 
EHRs. Further, they should restrict family members’ and friends’ access to 
their EHRs, subject to physician recommendations and physical conditions 
that require it.267  
C.  Increase the Scope of Fraud Investigation 
The sweeping provisions of the HITECH Act and its HIPAA 
modifications suggest that the world of EHRs is becoming more 
interwoven. In this light, prosecutors, auditors, and other anti-fraud actors 
should adopt a wider perspective in looking at the timeline of protected 
health information in electronic format. These anti-fraud actors should also 
adopt a wider perspective in looking at the potential parties involved in 
fraudulent activity. Specifically, as for looking at the timeline of protected 
health information, anti-fraud investigators should be mindful of the spread 
of EHR adoption and they should consider the reality that many potential 
actors—both good and bad—might have access to EHRs. Therefore, fraud 
investigators should rely on audit technology and meticulously follow each 
and every transaction—from creation to destruction—involved in the long 
life of EHRs. As for looking at potential parties involved in fraud, since the 
HITECH Act increased the scope of HIPAA liability for protected health 
information breaches to include business associates of covered entities, 
                                                                                                                          
266 45 C.F.R. § 160.203(a) (2013).   
267 Such as if the patient is mentally challenged and needs family assistance in evaluating his or 
her protected health information.   
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anti-fraud authorities should track closely the actions of all of these 
involved parties to ensure that both covered entities and business 
associates are not perpetrating fraud. Anti-fraud authorities should also 
stay abreast of all data breach notifications, paying close attention to what 
happens to EHRs after they have been accessed, breached, and/or used for 
other transactions.  
Further, given that the 2009 amendments to the False Claims Act 
greatly expanded the scope of liability for submitting false claims for 
payment from the government, anti-fraud authorities should look at the 
back end of health care transactions and should track suspect health care 
providers with increased vigor even after they have billed Medicare or 
Medicaid. Thus, as an example, if the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services determine that they have overpaid a particular health care 
provider, they should look closely at whether the provider is avoiding 
payment to the Centers when they seek reimbursement. In this manner, 
anti-fraud authorities can track down all of the various forms of fraud that 
afflict the modern U.S. health care industry.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
Physicians and scientists have used EHRs since the 1960s,268 and 
EHRs will become increasingly important in the world of health care for 
the near future. EHRs provide more comprehensive assessments of a 
patient’s health, they save production-related costs, they standardize the 
means of communication between disparate providers, and they 
exponentially improve the speed at which protected health information 
travels.269 However, EHRs present new exposures to fraud and data 
breaches. These exposures not only lead to financial losses, but they also 
lead to a diminished quality of care. If policymakers, prosecutors, and 
providers do not rein in these exposures and do not pierce EHR 
technology’s electronic veil covering fraud, then the aims of the HITECH 
Act might become meaningless. One author points out the ironic outcome 
that EHR technology can manifest, stating that “with technology comes 
risk—and for the medical providers that . . . rely upon [EHRs], that risk 
may include increased scrutiny, investigation, and even prosecution by the 
very government that promoted the switch to [EHRs] in the first place.”270 
                                                                                                                          
268  See Robyn Weisman, How EHR Came to Be (or Why Doctors Aren’t Like Airline Pilots), 
STORAGECRAFT (Apr. 25, 2014), http://www.storagecraft.com/blog/ehr-came-doctors-arent-like-
airline-pilots/ (explaining, for example, that Latter Day Saints Hospital in Utah began using software 
called Health Evaluation through Logical Programming (HELP)  in 1967, which was an early form of 
EHR technology).  
269 See ROACH, JR. ET AL., note 227, at 440–41 (discussing the core functional characteristics of 
EHRs).  
270 Robert Radick, EMRs: The New Health Care Fraud Frontier?, FORBES (Dec. 4, 2012, 4:58 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2012/12/04/emrs-the-new-health-care-fraud-frontier/.  
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EHR technology aims to achieve a more coordinated and holistic approach 
to health care. We should espouse a holistic approach in analyzing EHR 
technology’s effects on the law.   
